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The principal focus of this dissertation is to investigate the role of media coverage 
in the investment decisions of mutual fund investors and the consequent effects on flows 
into the funds. I examine investor attention and learning effects by examining the relation 
between media coverage of mutual funds and the net investor flows to the funds. Using a 
database of nearly 10,000 news articles, I find that the existence and stance of media 
coverage affects net investor flows into the fund in ways consistent with investor 
attention and learning. Further, the media coverage does not have a uniform effect on 
flows. News articles with positive (negative) tones are associated with significant 
increases (decreases) in flows. I find that fund size and past performance influence the 
impact of media coverage on mutual fund flows. I also find that, as a fund ages and 
investors receive additional news about the fund, there are smaller effects from the news. 
This is consistent with the hypothesis that investors learn about funds through media 
coverage and that this knowledge affects their investment behavior. These results suggest 
that media coverage can have significant economic effects on mutual funds through the 
effects on investors’ attention and learning. 
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Mutual funds have become very popular with investors over the past 25 years. 
Nearly half of all U.S. households owned mutual funds in 2006, up from less than 6% in 
1980.1 The total assets held by mutual funds increased by almost 6000% from $135 
billion in 1980 to $8.9 trillion in 2005.2 This explosive growth of the mutual fund 
industry has drawn considerable attention from the media as well as academic 
researchers. Much of the research has addressed issues of performance measurement and 
attribution, managerial behavior and incentives, economies of scale, fees and costs, and 
various other topics. One area that has received little attention is the impact of media 
coverage on mutual fund flows. The few studies that have focused on this topic have 
limited empirical work.  
Nearly ninety percent of mutual fund investors are individuals.3 Investors have 
thousands of mutual funds to choose from, and many investors have no training in how to 
select a mutual fund. When it comes to investment decisions, given the vast amount of 
information available and the limited resources, investors have to be selective in 
information processing. One potential important source of information and knowledge for 
investors is media coverage of mutual funds.  
                                                 
1 Source: Investment Company Institute, 2006 
2 Source: Investment Company Institute, 2006 




The importance of media coverage as a source of investor information is 
highlighted in a survey of mutual fund investors conducted by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and a market 
research firm. In examining the responses to this survey, Alexander, Jones and Nigro 
(1998) find that in choosing which mutual funds to purchase, 42% of the investors state 
that they rely on financial publications like newspapers and magazines for information 
about the funds. Further, the authors find that for investors who purchase their funds 
directly from the fund company (versus through other sources such as brokers, 
employers, banks or insurance companies), 68% state that they rely on financial 
publications. 
More than nine in ten households owning mutual funds had internet access in 
2006 and of these, 57% used the internet to obtain investment information.4 The scenario 
was very different a decade ago. The sample period for the data used in this dissertation 
is 1994-2000. Internet did not play as significant a role during that period. In the mid-
nineties, most mutual funds websites were limited in terms of information and did not 
have much transaction capability.  In fact, it was not until 2000 that Investment Company 
Institute conducted a study measuring mutual fund shareholders’ access to the internet. 
Less than 32% of mutual fund shareholders visited fund-related websites in 2000 and 
49% of shareholders who used the internet read financial publications online.5 Thus, even 
at the end of the sample period, the media played a critical role in providing information 
about mutual funds to shareholders.  
                                                 
4 Source: Investment Company Institute, 2006 




A few studies have touched upon the importance of media coverage. Merton 
(1987) mentions that a newspaper or other mass media story about a firm that reaches a 
large number of investors who are not currently shareholders, could induce some of this 
number to incur the set-up costs to follow and invest in the firm. Barber and Odean 
(2004) posit that news is a primary mechanism for catching investors’ attention and 
provide evidence that investors buy stocks that catch their attention. Tetlock (forthcoming 
JF) suggests that measures of media content serve as a proxy for investor sentiment or 
non-informational trading. He finds that high levels of media pessimism robustly predict 
downward pressure on market prices, and unusually high or low values of media 
pessimism forecast high market trading volume. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) 
state that current good news has power in predicting positive returns in the future. They 
highlight the need for a superior way of estimating the strength of news announcements. 
Sirri and Tufano (1998) find circumstantial evidence that garnering a larger share of 
current media citations is related to faster current growth of mutual funds. They conclude 
that “If the media are important determinants of consumer decisions, they probably 
deserve much more attention in the finance literature than our simple count ..”.   
This dissertation aims to contribute to the finance literature by conducting an in-
depth analysis of the impact of media coverage, including the type and tone 
classifications of almost 10,000 news stories. The principal focus is an investigation of 
the pivotal role played by media coverage in the investment decisions of mutual fund 
investors and the consequent effects on flows into the fund. I propose that business news 
circulating in public can have significant, economically realizable and relevant 




decisions by capturing the attention of investors and facilitating in their learning about 
mutual funds. This hypothesis can be tested empirically as the decisions of investors to 
purchase or redeem mutual fund shares should translate into net flows of capital into the 
fund. Specifically, I test the hypothesis that the existence of recent media coverage of a 
mutual fund influences investor flows into the fund. The results are consistent with the 
preliminary results in the previous studies mentioned above. Not only do I find that the 
existence of media coverage is associated with a significant increase in fund flows, I also 
find that such coverage has a stronger impact on fund flows than the fund's most recent 
performance. These results provide further evidence that media coverage can have 
significant economic effects on mutual funds. 
The effects of media range from the obvious to the latent. A number of event 
studies provide evidence for the speed with which the market reacts to news.6 However, 
the impact of media is not restricted to fast and directly measurable responses by stock 
prices. Media coverage of assets can have a multitude of latent effects, among which are 
learning and attention effects. These effects of media coverage, along with the relevant 
hypotheses, are described in greater detail in the following sections.  
 
Learning Effects of Media Coverage 
A salient feature of media coverage is that it is diverse, providing different types 
of information.  The coverage may provide information about the fund, its characteristics 
                                                 
6 For example, Patell and Wolfson (1984) and Jennings and Starks (1986) demonstrate that price 
movements in connection with dividend and earnings announcements through the Dow Jones News Service 
set in prior to publication. The main spike in stock prices follows within five to fifteen minutes after the 





(such as fees, service, and distribution), its return performance, or insights into the 
managers’ abilities.  Consequently, the media coverage of mutual funds can have 
multiple effects on investors’ learning about funds, and ultimately on their flows into or 
out of the funds. Investor learning from media coverage could also impact the fund's 
existing investors by leading them to reevaluate their current investments in such funds, 
resulting in either increased investments (in the case of a positive news story) or reduced 
investments (in the case of a negative news story). 
Media coverage provides investors with the opportunity to learn about mutual 
funds and educates them to weigh various factors when buying or selling funds. Investing 
in mutual funds requires a learning process. There have been various approaches to 
learning in the finance literature. Some of the approaches focus on the process itself. For 
instance, many rational learning papers use Bayesian updating to model the learning 
process, while most behavioral finance papers on learning use psychological biases to 
model the investor learning process. Other approaches to learning focus on the source of 
the learning rather than the process. For example, investors can learn from their past 
purchase experience, or media coverage of assets can be a key source of investor 
learning.  
A popular approach in the study of rational learning theory is to model investor 
learning using Bayesian updating. When investors have imperfect information about 
expected returns or cash flows, they must learn about the unknown price process from 
whatever information is available, which is formally modeled using Bayesian analysis. 
The underlying concept here is that the prices already “contain” the news and as a result, 




model of rational learning, the investors (and sometimes the managers) update their 
posteriors on the basis of the history of observed returns as Bayesians. This method 
focuses primarily on the actual process of learning developed in these Bayesian models.  
Several recent models for judging mutual fund performance and for examining 
the dynamics of the mutual fund flow-performance relation rely on investor learning 
about the mutual fund managers’ skills through time (Berk and Green, 2004; Lynch and 
Musto, 2003; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2002; Baks, Metrick, and Wachter, 2001). In these 
models, investors learn about managerial ability by observing the realized excess returns 
the manager produces. This learning is then the source of the relationship between 
performance and the flow of funds. 
The behavioral finance papers adopt an alternate perspective on learning. 
Hirshleifer (2001) argues that the purely rational approach is being subsumed by a 
broader approach based upon the psychology of investors. Empirical securities markets 
research in the last few decades has presented a body of evidence with systematic 
patterns that are not easy to explain with rational asset pricing models. He argues that the 
evidence on heuristics and biases seems to suggest that Bayesian updating is not fully 
descriptive of human behavior. In view of this, many recent studies have explicitly 
modeled how decision making occurs in a way that reflects psychological biases.  
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) focus on psychological evidence as 
a basis for assumptions about investor behavior. They theorize that news watchers 
rationally use fundamental news but ignore prices. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) 
propose a parsimonious model of investor sentiment based on how investors form beliefs. 




such as earnings. Further, the authors refer to under-reaction evidence indicating that 
current good news has power in predicting positive returns in the future. While financial 
theorists have traditionally examined how information is transmitted by prices, volume, 
or corporate actions, Hirshleifer (2001) notes that media contagion of ideas and behavior 
also seems important. 
Some studies approach learning by focusing on the source of the learning rather 
than the actual process of the learning method. One potential source of learning is past 
purchase experience of the investors. Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) propose that front-
end load fees and commissions are more obvious and salient; and front-end load fees are 
particularly salient for investors who have previously paid them. The authors provide 
evidence of learning among mutual fund investors where they find that experienced fund 
purchasers pay, on average, about half the front-end load fees of first time purchasers. 
From this evidence they conclude that investors have learned to avoid front-end load 
funds by experience. 
Media coverage has been considered as a potential source of investor learning in 
some studies, albeit not about mutual funds. McQueen and Thorley (1997) find evidence 
that supports the investor learning hypothesis using data from the gold market. They 
conduct an empirical analysis of the predictive power of leading gold stock returns before 
and after the first time a gold analyst for Merrill Lynch was quoted in the Wall Street 
Journal about the lead/lag relationship between the prices of gold and the stocks of gold-
producing companies. Consistent with the investor learning hypothesis, they find that the 
predictive power of the gold stock returns have diminished since the first public 




In this dissertation, I focus on the media as the source of learning. Investors not 
only learn some facts about mutual funds but also learn how much importance to attach 
to those facts from the emphasis placed on them by the news media. Over the years, 
investors have had the opportunity to learn about mutual funds and to change the ways in 
which they weigh various factors when buying funds. The longer a fund has been around, 
the higher the potential for investor learning about the fund. Fund age is hence a good 
proxy for potential investor learning about the fund. I test the theory that investors have 
better knowledge of older funds that have been around for a longer time. I hypothesize 
that media coverage has a greater impact for younger funds than older mutual funds, and 
find the results consistent with the learning theory.  
A key influence of media is knowledge gain leading to investor learning. In 
general, the impact of media is usually classified as cognitive, affective, or behavioral. 
Cognitive effects are those that concern the acquisition of information - what people 
learn, how beliefs are structured in the mind, how needs for information are satisfied or 
not. These effects include concerns about what is learned as well as how much is learned. 
I explore this aspect of learning empirically by examining the information content of the 
media coverage in terms of the tone or the posture of the news article, i.e., positive or 
negative slant in the article with regard to the fund. Consistent with the cognitive effects 
described above, I find that news articles with higher information content, that is, 
displaying a posture with regard to the fund, have a stronger impact on mutual fund flows 





Attention Effects of Media Coverage 
Attention has long been recognized as a critical variable in the processing of mass 
media. Even if news is publicly available, it is not incorporated into investment decisions 
until investors pay attention. Huberman and Regev (2001) provide a vivid example. The 
publication of an article in the New York Times about a new cancer-curing drug from 
EntreMed attracted great public attention and generated a daily return of more than 300% 
in its stock, even though the same story had already been published more than five 
months earlier in Nature Magazine and in other newspapers.  
There is no doubt that the media, as generators of attention, possess the potential 
to contribute to the overreaction in investor behavior by focusing public attention. The 
range and reach of the media has greatly increased as economic and non-economic events 
are today broadcast across borders and in real time. Schuster (2003) contends that the 
competitive situation on the media market intensifies the exaggeration of the contents and 
an increase in their emotional appeal through prominent placement and an eye-catching 
presentation of selected issues. Klibanoff et al. (1998) find that the price of a closed-end 
country fund reacts more strongly to news about its fundamentals when the country 
whose stocks the fund holds appears on the front page of the newspaper.  
According to Griffin and Tversky (1992), in revising their forecasts, people focus 
too much on the strength of the evidence, and too little on its weight, relative to a rational 
Bayesian. The authors use a framework in which people update their beliefs based on the 
strength and weight of new evidence.7 The Griffin and Tversky theory predicts that, 
                                                 
7 Strength refers to such aspects of the evidence as salience and extremity, whereas weight refers to 




holding the weight of information constant, news with more strength would generate a 
bigger reaction from investors. Asymmetrical price movements in response to 
comparable news give grounds to believe that investors overreact in some cases and 
under react in others. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) provide an explanation, well-
known to psychologists, that people attach too much significance to information that is 
particularly striking. According to the behavioral theory, conspicuous news events would 
lead to irrational price fluctuations, due to their increased visibility and the subsequent 
overreactions of many investors. In other words, the more visibly an event appears in the 
media, the stronger price reactions should be, regardless of how significant the event is in 
itself.  
I test this prediction from behavioral theory in the context of media coverage of 
mutual funds. When a fund is portrayed with a numerical ranking in a news article, it is 
more likely to capture the attention of investors than a fund that does not appear in such 
an article.8 I test for differences between the flows into funds that were listed in a ranking 
article against funds with almost identical returns that were not listed in the ranking 
article.  I find significant differences in flows between the two sets of funds, thus 
providing evidence that there is a significantly stronger attention effect for the fund that is 
highlighted in the ranking article than the fund with almost identical returns that is not 
mentioned in the ranking article. 
Merton (1987) advances the investor recognition hypothesis, in which he posits 
that since an individual investor will hold only those securities that he knows, familiarity 
with an asset can affect its value. The hypothesis suggests that investors conserve the 
                                                 




resources required to gather information on stocks by actively following only a few 
stocks. Thus, each investor knows only about a subset of the available securities. 
Increased awareness of mutual funds due to media coverage implies that investors will 
view these funds as possibilities for their investment opportunity set in line with the 
investor recognition hypothesis.  
Hirshleifer (2001) describes a strong and robust mere exposure effect in which 
exposure to an unreinforced stimulus tends to make people like it more. He suggests that 
the basis for this heuristic may be that what is familiar, being understood better, is often 
viewed as less risky. The implication derived here for media coverage of mutual funds is 
that investors are more likely to be familiar with funds that they recognize as a result of 
exposure to the fund in the media.   
A key cognitive process involved in our experiencing media is attention. As a 
prerequisite to any other involvement with the media, we must select some information to 
attend to and process. In addressing the selective aspects of attention, Kahneman (1973) 
suggests that we selectively attend to some stimuli, or aspects of stimulation, in 
preference to others. Attended events are more likely to be perceived consciously and in 
greater detail. Kahneman further adds that recognition is highest for a stimulus which has 
all the critical features, is presented at high intensity, and is attended. The amount of 
attention that is allocated to a perceived article or event affects subsequent processing of 
the information contained in it. 
Kahneman emphasizes that attention is a scarce cognitive resource. Odean (1999) 
posits that many investors limit their search to stocks that have recently captured their 




mutual funds.9 The constraints of time, resources and mobility impose severe limits on 
the acquisition of information. Thus, rather than incur the costs of finding a fund, they 
simply invest in funds that come to their attention. Sirri and Tufano (1998) classify media 
coverage about mutual funds as a measure of investor search costs.  They contend that 
funds with more media coverage will grow faster and may have a stronger flow-
performance relationship.  
Barber and Odean (2004) propose that attention is a major factor determining the 
stocks that individuals buy. They provide evidence that individual investors are net 
buyers of attention-grabbing stocks, e.g., stocks in the news. Firms that are in the news 
are more likely to catch investors' attention than those that are not. I analyze the attention 
effect of media coverage on mutual funds by testing the hypothesis that mutual funds 
with higher numbers of news stories receive greater net inflows from investors. I find that 
in addition to fund flows responding to the existence of media coverage, the frequency of 
news stories also exerts significant influence on mutual fund flows. Historically, attention 
has been equated with simple exposure. However, research has brought to light that 
attention to news media appears to be a significant difference that accounts for substantial 
variation in learning beyond the act of simple exposure. In this dissertation, I test for the 
various aspects of attention by analysis of different classifications of the news articles 
based on strength, tone and type of the media coverage.  
                                                 





Highlights of the results  
In this dissertation, I examine several issues related to the media coverage of 
mutual funds.  In particular, I examine the relation between a mutual fund's net flows and 
media coverage of that fund.  I also examine the learning and attention effects via testing 
of hypotheses derived from relevant theories and literature. An advantage of examining 
attention and learning effects through the use of net fund flows is that one can obtain a 
more direct effect of news coverage than is possible with other types of assets, which 
have confounding valuation effects.   
The database for media coverage of mutual funds comprising of nearly 10,000 
news articles was developed specially for this study. I examine the determinants of media 
coverage using several univariate analyses and a multivariate probit estimation model.  
The results show that fund characteristics affect the likelihood of media coverage.  Larger 
funds, those with extreme (high or low) performance, and those with more volatile 
returns are more likely to have news stories in general.  Larger funds also have more 
positive news articles than smaller funds. I then investigate whether the existence and 
tone of media coverage affects investor attention and learning as is manifested by flows 
into the fund.   
By examining the tone of the news articles, I test for differential effects on fund 
flows depending on whether the article has a positive, neutral or negative tone.  I find 
small positive effects for the articles that have a neutral tone, i.e., there is no positive or 




have an attention effect on investors.  In contrast, I find much stronger effects (in 
absolute magnitude) when the tone is positive or negative, suggesting that the news 
article also provides opportunity for learning by investors.  
Napoleon is on record for saying that "Three hostile newspapers are more to be 
feared than a thousand bayonets." While this appears to have held true for politicians 
across time, I find that this also holds true for financial assets. I find that there is indeed 
such a thing as bad publicity. Media coverage does not have a uniform effect as the 
existence of news articles with a positive tone in a month is associated with a 1.5% 
increase in net investor flows.  There is a 1% decrease in flows associated with the 
existence of news articles with a negative tone in a month.  Considering that the average 
monthly fund flow for my sample is 1.08%, the above results suggest that media 
coverage can have significant economic effects on mutual funds.  
I find a differential in flows based on fund age in the effects of a news story, 
which is driven by the younger funds. I find that, as a fund ages and investors receive 
additional news about the fund, there are smaller effects from the news. Older funds do 
not receive as high an inflow as do younger funds, even controlling for the differences in 
sizes between the funds. I also find that fund size and past performance influence the 
impact of media coverage on mutual fund flows. Media coverage seems to play a more 
significant role for smaller and lesser known funds, and the fund’s return performance 
enhances the impact of media coverage. I construct a test to differentiate between the 
attention and learning effects of media coverage on mutual fund flows. I examine the 
flows into funds that were listed in a ranking article against funds with almost identical 




between the two sets of funds, suggesting that just getting into a ranking article can 
provide significant attention effects for a fund. 
I employ the Heckman model of self-selection to conduct the empirical analyses. 
The study of the influence of media coverage on fund flows may have a potential 
endogeneity problem. It is highly unlikely that all mutual funds have an equal probability 
of receiving media coverage. It is also unlikely that the media randomly selects funds to 
write about. Selection bias may occur when funds that receive media coverage have a 
greater propensity to receive higher inflows. Then the positive effects of media coverage 
on mutual fund flows may be overstated. I control for this potential endogeneity by using 
the Heckman selection model to account for the selection bias.  
I conduct an additional robustness check on the results using alternate 
specification of the regression model. I employ the Sirri and Tufano (1998) piecewise 
linear specification for return performance. I then use the Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
methodology by running monthly cross-sectional regressions and then averaging the 
coefficients across the 84 months using Newey-West (1987) t-statistics to test the 
significance of the coefficients. The results for these specifications are consistent with the 
original specification of the regression model. The economic and statistic significance of 
the news variables are thus robust for different model specifications. I also conduct 
Granger causality tests and find evidence in support of recent media coverage leading to 
mutual fund flows. 
In summary, the principal objective of this dissertation is to understand how the 
media coverage of mutual funds impacts the purchase decisions of investors, which are 




multiple effects of media coverage on investors’ attention and learning about mutual 
funds, and ultimately on their flows into or out of the funds. 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the 
relevant literature, including insights from Psychology applicable to my research. Chapter 
3 develops the key hypotheses. Chapter 4 discusses the data and methodology. Chapter 5 
studies the influence of fund characteristics on media coverage. Chapter 6 describes the 
Heckman selection model and the accompanying empirical analysis of the impact of 
media coverage on mutual fund flows. Chapter 7 presents the robustness tests and 






The principal focus of this dissertation is to better understand the role played by 
media coverage in the investment decisions of mutual fund investors. My study draws on 
various branches of the literatures on mutual fund performance and inflows. In this 
chapter, I highlight some of the relevant literature with regard to mutual fund flows and 
media coverage, in addition to learning models from the rational as well as the behavioral 
approach. I also describe certain key insights that can be derived from the Psychology 
literature.  
 
FUND FLOWS AND MEDIA COVERAGE 
Most previous research on the determinants of mutual fund flows (e.g., Ippolito, 
1992; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997) largely focuses on the relation between measures of 
past performance and future flows. However, these studies implicitly assume that it is 
costless for investors to gather and process information on the universe of available 
funds. Consistent with investors having lower search costs for those funds that they have 
been exposed to through the media, Sirri and Tufano (1998) find that mutual funds 
receiving more media attention receive correspondingly higher inflows.  
Sirri and Tufano (1998) primarily study the performance-flow relationship and the 




classify media coverage about mutual funds as a measure of investor search costs and 
conduct a preliminary study on the impact of media coverage on mutual funds. They 
hypothesize that funds mentioned more often in the media are more easily recognized by 
investors and thereby resulting in lower search costs for the investors. They analyze the 
determinants of media coverage and find that funds with extreme performance garner a 
higher share of media attention. Their study provides some evidence that a larger share of 
current media cites is related to faster current growth. Their analysis is however restricted 
by their measure for media attention. A simple count of references to each fund in 
Lexis/Nexis does not provide much opportunity for a more detailed analysis. The 
database for my analysis, on the other hand, contains detailed classification for each 
article in terms of tone and type of media coverage. This allows for a richer exploration 
of the impact of media coverage on mutual fund flows. 
Reuter and Zitzewitz (2004) look at mutual fund recommendations from a sample 
of six publications – three personal finance magazines (Money, Kiplinger’s Personal 
Finance, and SmartMoney) and two newspapers (Wall Street Journal, and New York 
Times) along with Consumer Reports. They analyze the effectiveness of expert opinion 
and its influence on mutual fund investors. The empirical results on the impact of media 
mentions is restricted to the evidence that positive recommendations are associated with a 
significant increase in fund assets over 12 months, and that too for New York Times and 
SmartMoney only. Their focus is more on the relative influence of media mentions and 
advertising, as well as the bias in advertising. They present evidence that personal finance 
magazines are more likely to recommend the funds of their advertisers. They do not find 




results as the only personal finance magazine from their list that also appears in my list of 
12 publications is Money.  
These studies suggest that investors rely on the media and advertising when 
deciding which mutual funds to buy and sell. Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) find that 
Morningstar ratings influence fund flows. I find that media coverage, both positive and 
negative, has a strong influence on the financial decisions of mutual fund investors by 
facilitating in their learning about mutual funds. 
 
INVESTOR LEARNING MODELS 
Several recent models for judging mutual fund performance and for examining 
the dynamics of the mutual fund flow-performance relation rely on investor learning 
about the mutual fund managers’ skills through time (Berk and Green, 2004; Lynch and 
Musto, 2003; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2002; Baks, Metrick, and Wachter, 2001). When 
investors have imperfect information about expected returns or cash flows, they must 
learn about the unknown price process from whatever information is available. Investor 
learning has been formally modeled using Bayesian analysis in most studies in the 
rational literature on learning models. Typically in such models, the investors (and 
sometimes the managers) update their posteriors on the basis of the history of observed 
returns as Bayesians. 
Berk and Green (2004) find that there is learning about managerial ability from 
past returns. Investors learn about managerial ability by observing the realized excess 




performance and the flow of funds. Investors and the manager update their posteriors on 
the basis of the history of observed returns as Bayesians. 
Lynch and Musto (2003) endogenize the flow-performance relationship. Similar 
to Berk and Green (2004), investors and managers learn about managers' abilities and the 
profitability of their strategies from past returns. However in Lynch and Musto (2003), 
differences in ability lead to persistent differences in performance, while Berk and Green 
(2004) show that rational learning and strong response of flows to performance can be 
consistent with no persistence in performance. Baks, Metrick and Wachter (2001) and 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) both use the Bayesian approach to performance evaluation. 
In the former study the authors develop a flexible set of prior beliefs about managerial 
skill, while in the latter study the authors distinguish beliefs about the ability of the 
benchmarks to price passive assets from beliefs about the potential skill of fund 
managers.  
The behavioral finance papers adopt an alternate approach that Bayesian updating 
is not fully descriptive of human behavior. In view of this, many recent studies have 
explicitly modeled how decision-making occurs in a way that reflects psychological 
biases.  Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) focus on psychological evidence 
as a basis for assumptions about investor behavior. They theorize that news watchers 
rationally use fundamental news but ignore prices. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) 
propose a model of investor sentiment based on how investors form beliefs, with a focus 
on learning about the time-series process of a performance measure such as earnings. 
Further, the authors refer to under-reaction evidence indicating that current good news 




Some recent papers have examined attention and learning effects, though not in 
the context of media coverage of mutual funds. Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) contend 
that over time, investors have become increasingly aware of and averse to mutual fund 
costs. They find that investors have learned more quickly to avoid salient fees like high 
front-end-load and commission costs than high operating expense costs. They test the 
hypothesis that investors have learned to avoid front-end load fees by experience. The 
results of their test provide direct evidence of learning. They find that experienced fund 
purchasers pay, on average, about half the front-end load fees of first time purchasers. 
Barber and Odean (2004) propose an alternative model of decision making based 
on the assumption that investors buy stocks that catch their attention. They believe that 
this attention-based buying results from the formidable search problem that investors face 
when buying a stock. The authors suggest that investors solve this problem by only 
considering for purchase those stocks that have recently caught their attention. They test 
and confirm the hypothesis that individual investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing 
stocks, e.g., stocks in the news. They argue that firms that are in the news are more likely 
to catch investors' attention than those that are not as news is a primary mechanism for 
catching investors’ attention. I apply a similar logic to the study of mutual funds in this 
dissertation and provide evidence that investors respond to media coverage of mutual 
funds by the significant increase in fund flows. 
Merton (1987) advances the investor recognition hypothesis to describe the 
portfolio formation of informationally constrained investors. He notes that individual 
investors tend to hold only a few different common stocks in their portfolios. He points 




conserve these resources by actively following only a few stocks. His analysis also 
implies that changes in investor recognition will coincide with changes in investment. 
Merton's paper emphasizes the differences in the breadth of investor cognizance. The 
analysis in this dissertation emphasizes the differences in the breadth of media coverage 
of mutual funds that leads to investor cognizance.  
 
INSIGHTS FROM PSYCHOLOGY 
Much human learning is aimed at developing cognitive skills on how to gain and 
use knowledge for future use. This section presents some insights from the cognitive 
theory of psychology in the context of its implications for learning and attention effects 
of media coverage of mutual funds. After presenting the theoretical backdrop, I describe 
an influential cognitive model to study the learning and attention effects of the media.  I 
conclude each sub-section by highlighting its application to my research. 
 
Cognitive Theory of Learning  
Cognitive theories of learning in the field of psychology view information 
processing as constructive; that is, people do not literally encode and retrieve the 
information that they read or hear in the media. Rather, as they comprehend, they 
interpret in accordance with their prior knowledge and beliefs, as well as the context in 
which the message is received. Comprehension of a news story emerges through a 




our minds. The mind is always actively thinking about what we see or hear and those 
thoughts become an important part of the constructive process of comprehension. 
The social cognitive theory was originally developed out of the stimulus-response 
behaviorist psychology known as social learning theory. Over the years this model has 
increasingly stressed personal agency and cognitive processes. We learn behaviors by 
observing others performing those behaviors and subsequently imitating them. The 
relevance to media occurs when the media model becomes the source of observational 
learning. 
There are four sub-functions for observational learning from the media. First, 
someone must be exposed to the media example and attend to it. Second, he or she must 
be capable of symbolically encoding and remembering the observed events, including 
both constructing the representation and cognitively and enactively rehearsing it. Third, 
the person must be able to translate the symbolic conceptions into appropriate action. 
Finally, motivational processes develop by internal or external reinforcement (reward) for 
performing the behavior. For example, a person's purchasing behavior could be 
reinforced if the behavior impressed others, or more importantly, if the person received a 
monetary gain as a result. Social cognitive theory was initially developed in the context 
of studying the effects of violent media models on behavior. Although that is still the 
most studied application, the theory has other applications as well, as in the modeling of 
sexual, prosocial, or purchasing behavior.  
The first sub-function for observational learning from the media is exposure and 
attention to the media.  My dissertation conducts an empirical study of this important 




primarily in terms of the existence of news stories about a given mutual fund in the media 
that the investor is exposed to. An additional measure of media exposure is given by the 
circulation numbers of the various periodicals and newspapers. The theory predicts that 
the higher the number of news stories about a fund in a given month, the more likely it 
will capture the attention of investors. Thus, the number of articles about a given mutual 
fund in the media in a month forms a measure of potential attention to the media 
coverage by an individual. 
 
Capacity Theory of Attention 
Capacity theory of attention assumes that a general limit exists regarding an 
individual’s capacity to perform mental work. It also assumes that this limited capacity 
can be allocated with considerable freedom among concurrent activities. Capacity theory 
provides a theoretical framework to study how one pays attention to objects and to acts. 
In this context, the terms exert effort, invest capacity and pay attention are often used 
interchangeably. To explain man’s limited ability to carry out multiple activities at the 
same time, capacity theory assumes that the total amount of attention that can be 
deployed at any time is limited.  
Different mental activities impose different demands on the individual’s limited 
capacity. An easy task demands little effort, and a difficult task demands much effort. 
When the supply of the individual’s attention capacity does not meet the demands of the 
task, performance falters, or fails entirely. In describing his capacity model for attention, 
Kahneman (1973) observes that variations of physiological arousal accompany variations 




It is hence assumed that more capacity is available when arousal is moderately high than 
when arousal is low.   The author also assumes that momentary capacity, attention, or 
effort is controlled by feedback from the execution of ongoing activities, that is, a rise in 
the demands of these activities causes an increase in the level of arousal, effort, and 
attention. 
Kahneman (1973) emphasizes that attention is a scarce cognitive resource. The 
vast amount of information available on mutual funds places a considerable strain on the 
investors’ capacity for attention. This opens up a potential for media coverage to play a 
bigger role than other sources of information about mutual funds. Media coverage can 
also influence what information investors are more likely to attend to by capturing their 
attention with certain news stories.  
 
Limited Capacity Model 
One of the most influential recent cognitive models is Annie Lang's Limited 
Capacity Model of media information processing (Lang, 2000). Drawing on basic 
cognitive psychology, Lang makes two basic assumptions: (1) people are information 
processors, and (2) the ability to process information is limited. Both of these 
assumptions are directly applicable for investor learning from media coverage, because 
investors have thousands of mutual funds to choose from and many investors have no 
training in how to select a mutual fund. When it comes to investment decisions, given the 
vast amount of information available and the limited resources, investors have to be 
selective in information processing. These information processes are sometimes 




major sub-processes are encoding, storage, and retrieval, which may be done partially in 
parallel. Given that processing resources are limited, heavy allocation to one may result 
in superficial allocation to another. 
One of the automatic selection mechanisms steering the encoding of information 
is the orienting response. Research suggests that this physiological and behavioral 
response is associated with attention and stimulus intake. When our attention is captured 
by something, more cognitive resources are allocated to encoding the information from 
that source. Two major types of stimuli activate automatic selection processes: (a) 
information that is relevant to the goals and needs of the individual, and (b) information 
that represents change or an unexpected occurrence in the environment. 
Historically, in the mass communication field, the sub-process of encoding has 
been operationally equated to measures of exposure and attention. Many communication 
models and theories treat this step as a simple condition on the road to information 
processing, but there is nothing simple about exposure and attention in Lang's model. In 
the model, the process of linking newly encoded information to previously encoded 
information (or memories) is called storage. Some bits of information will be more 
thoroughly stored while other parts receive only cursory storage. Storage is affected by 
both individual differences and resource limitations of the human information-processing 
system. Retrieval, the final sub-process in this model, is the process of reactivating a 
stored mental representation of some aspect of the message. The more associative links 
there are to a piece of information (that is, the more thoroughly it has been stored), the 




associated with learning the content of a message as well as an ongoing process during 
message reception.  
An example applied to media coverage of mutual funds may better illustrate the 
concepts presented in the model. An investor reading a news article about a major mutual 
fund in his or her portfolio will result in concurrent retrieval of what he or she knows 
(about mutual funds in general, about this fund in particular, and about his or her 
investment in that fund) to understand the article and store this new fund information into 
his or her associative network. In this case, the calls for attention made by the article may 
actually interfere with the process of storage. In addition, the individual is likely to 
allocate a fair number of resources to retrieval in order to integrate new knowledge with 
old knowledge. The mutual fund investor is much more likely to run into a resource-
limited situation than the person reading a newspaper to be entertained, since the former 
is purposely allocating resources to storage and concurrent retrieval in order to learn and 
retain the content of the article concerning the mutual fund in the portfolio. 
In this dissertation, my study of the impact of media coverage on mutual fund 
flows draws from the theory underlying the limited capacity model.  As discussed earlier, 
the vast amount of information available coupled with limited resources force investors to 
be selective in information processing while making investment decisions. Since time and 
cognitive resources are limited, individual investors cannot analyze all the financial data 
optimally. Limited attention, memory, and processing capacities force a focus on subsets 
of available information.  Thus, the basic tenets of the limited capacity model are directly 




The intuition developed from the psychology theory presented in this chapter 
contributes to my study on media coverage of mutual funds. The cognitive theory of 
learning and the capacity theory of attention outlined in this chapter provide a theoretical 
basis for understanding the human psychology of learning and attention. The limited 
capacity model then applies concepts based on these theories to model information 
processing and learning from media. The media are not only influential in telling people 
what to think, they are also eminently successful in telling them what to think about, thus 
producing attention and learning effects.  Mass media hence has the ability to structure 
investor cognitions and to effect change among existing cognitions.  
One potential manifestation of the change in investors’ cognition is a 
corresponding change in their investing behavior, which may be studied by an analysis of 
mutual fund flows. I conduct various analyses of the impact of media coverage on fund 
flows including tests of learning and attention effects of media coverage. In the next 
chapter I develop the relevant hypotheses from the learning and attention effects. Later 
chapters of this dissertation present detailed descriptions of the specific tests for these 





Development of Hypotheses 
 
In this chapter, I develop the hypotheses regarding the role played by media 
coverage in the investment decisions of mutual fund investors. If media coverage affects 
investor attention and learning about a fund, one would expect that investors would 
change their holdings in the funds after the news event. I test this implication by 
examining the effect media coverage has on investor flows into the fund, while 
controlling for other major factors that affect fund flows.  
The theory on attention predicts that firms that are in the news are more likely to 
catch investors’ attention than those that are not. The EntreMed example presented in 
Chapter 1 highlights the point that even if news is publicly available, it is not 
incorporated into investment decisions until and unless investors pay attention. The most 
basic effect of media coverage is to simply make investors aware of funds that they had 
not previously considered. The increased awareness of mutual funds implies that 
investors will view these funds as possibilities for their investment opportunity. Media 
coverage also reduces search costs for mutual fund investors and thus has a material 
impact on investor fund choices. Specifically, I test the hypothesis: 





The first hypothesis tests the overall impact of media coverage, and hence I use 
absolute values of fund flows as the independent variable in the regressions. Thus the 
first hypothesis tests whether overall media coverage, irrespective of its posture, results in 
greater absolute fund flows. The rest of the hypotheses take into consideration the posture 
of the media coverage and hence directional fund flows will be used thereafter for all the 
regressions.  
A key influence of media is knowledge leading to investor learning. The cognitive 
effects of learning include concerns about what is learned as well as how much is learned. 
I explore this aspect of learning empirically by examining the information content of the 
media coverage in terms of the posture of the news story, i.e., positive or negative slant in 
the article with regard to the fund. Investor learning from media coverage could also 
impact the fund's existing investors by leading them to reevaluate their current 
investments in such funds, resulting in either increased investments (in the case of a 
positive news story) or reduced investments (in the case of a negative news story). This 
can result in a significant impact on fund flows considering the finding by Alexander, 
Jones and Nigro (1998) that in choosing which mutual funds to purchase, 42% of the 
investors state that they rely on financial publications like newspapers and magazines for 
information about the funds. I specifically test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: News articles with positive or negative posture have a stronger 
impact on mutual fund flows than news articles with neutral tone or no posture. 
 
I test for whether fund characteristics influence the probability of media coverage, 




than just the probability of media coverage. There is considerable finance literature on 
fund flows to provide evidence that determinants of fund flows include fund 
characteristics such as past performance and fund size. In addition to their direct impact 
on fund flows, I propose that these fund characteristics also impact the effect of media 
coverage on fund flows. Specifically, I hypothesize that better past performance will 
enhance the impact of positive news stories and diminish the impact of negative news 
stories on fund flows. In the case of fund size, I predict a smaller impact of news on flows 
of larger and well known funds in contrast to the more significant role played by news for 
smaller and lesser known funds. I gather all these predictions under the umbrella of my 
next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Fund size and past performance influence the impact of media 
coverage on mutual fund flows. 
 
Learning theory suggests that investors are likely to have better knowledge of 
older funds that have been around for a longer time. This implies that the there is a 
weaker learning potential for funds that are older and have a greater cumulative number 
of news stories. Consistent with both attention and learning theories, I posit that media 
coverage of younger funds could bring them to the attention of investors, and that there 
may be more for investors to learn about younger funds. This leads to the hypothesis that 
media coverage has a greater impact for such funds than older and well known funds. 




Hypothesis 4: As a fund ages and investors receive additional news about the 
fund, the later news has smaller effects on fund flows.  
 
The previous hypotheses are consistent with both the attention and the learning 
theories. In order to differentiate between these theories, I devise a test in which I 
examine flow differences between two sets of matched funds. One fund in each pair has 
been listed in a ranking article, where the fund is assigned a numerical ranking anywhere 
in the text or table section of the news story.10 The other fund in the pair is closest to the 
first fund in terms of performance but has not been featured in a ranking article. Thus, the 
pair consists of two funds that are nearly identical in performance, but only one’s 
performance is mentioned in the press. I posit that a statistically significant difference in 
flows between the two funds will provide strong evidence for the attention effects of 
media coverage of mutual funds.  This leads to my final hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: A fund is more likely to catch the attention of investors when it 
makes a conspicuous appearance in the media, such as being portrayed with a numerical 
ranking.  
 
   
 
                                                 





Data and Methodology 
 
MUTUAL FUND DATA 
I construct a sample of mutual funds that existed in the CRSP mutual fund 
database over the 1994-2000 time period.  In order to provide tests of investor attention 
and learning about these funds through time, I include only funds that existed over the 
entire sample period.  I constrain the sample to growth funds for two reasons.  First, most 
previous research on mutual fund flows (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and 
Tufano, 1998) has focused on funds with the growth objective.  Second, funds with this 
objective appear to hold the most investor interest and are thus the most likely to generate 
media coverage and reflect investor attention and learning effects, if they exist.   
During the latter part of my sample period, mutual funds were sold in share 
classes.  The same fund, i.e., the same underlying portfolio of assets, can be purchased 
through different types of shares with different fees (and thus, different net returns).  See 
Appendix A for a brief description of mutual fund share classes.11  I identify 406 share 
classes for the 286 growth funds in the sample.  For each fund share class, I obtain 
information about its total net assets, returns, age, expense ratios, and load fees from the 
CRSP Mutual Fund database.  Although share classes of the same fund differ in their 
                                                 




flows, returns, and expense ratios, the vast majority of news articles concern the fund 
rather than a particular share class.  Further, without controlling for the commonality 
among the share classes of the same fund, my standard errors will be inflated.  
Consequently, I combine the share class observations into a single observation for each 
fund for each time period.  I use the total net assets of the share classes to construct a 
value-weighted variable for each of the fund characteristics.   
 
Variables of Mutual Fund Characteristics 
The following variables are used in this study to represent fund characteristics: 
Net Fund Flow 
I calculate net flows into fund i over period t with the following equation from 
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where TNAi,t represents fund i’s total net assets at the end of period t and Ri,t 
represents fund i’s return over period t.  In this measure, flowi,t represents the aggregate 
of all share classes for a particular fund and is expressed as a percentage flow.     
Market Flow to Growth Funds 
I construct a proxy for the average market flow to funds with the growth objective 




Log Lag TNA 
The Log Lag TNA variable is the natural logarithm of the previous period’s Total 
Net Assets (TNA). The monthly TNA is obtained as of the end of the specified month for 
which the data applies and is expressed in millions of dollars. 
Fund Return for period t 

































































NAVt is the Net Asset Value at the end of the period t. 
J is the number of dividend or capital gains distributions during the period. 
K is the number of NAV splits during the period. 
X_AMTjD is the jth dividend or capital gains distribution during the period. 
RE_NAVjD is the NAV at which the jth dividend or capital gains distribution was 
reinvested. 
X_AMTkS is the number of new shares per RE_NAVkS of old shares investors 
received in the kth NAV split over the period. 
RE_NAVkS is the number of old shares investors traded in for X_AMTkS new 






X_AMT  is the split ratio for the kth NAV split. 12 
                                                 




Return Volatility for month t  
For each fund, for each month, I calculate the return volatility as the standard 
deviation of monthly return over the previous 12 months.    
Return previous year 
I construct this variable as a 12-month moving statistic for each month. For each 














where Ri,t is the total monthly return for fund i over period t.   
Expense Ratio 
Expense Ratio is the percentage of the total investment that shareholders pay for 
the mutual fund’s operating expenses over the calendar year. 
Total Load Fee 
The total of all maximum front, deferred and rear-end load charges is a percentage 
total of loads applied to a fund. 
Fund Age 
I calculate fund age as the number of years since the year the fund was organized.  
Young Fund Flag 
 Yngi = 1 if fund i is in the youngest 1/3 of the sample by age, else = 0 
Old Fund Flag 





Descriptive Statistics of Mutual Fund Characteristics 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for each of the fund characteristic variables 
during my sample period. Panel A of Table 1 provides the key descriptive statistics for 
my full sample. Panel B provides the same statistics for each of the fund characteristics 
for the two sub-samples based on the existence (or lack thereof) of media coverage. Panel 
B also provides t-statistics for the differences in the means of the fund characteristics for 
sub-samples with and without media coverage. As the table shows, the growth funds in 
the sample vary greatly in size, ranging from about $22 million at the tenth percentile to 
well over $3 billion at the ninetieth percentile, with a mean (median) of $1.7 billion 
($245 million).  It is interesting to note that the mean fund size for observations with 
media coverage is over four times the mean fund size for observations with no media 
coverage, with the t-statistic for the difference in the two means being highly significant. 
This suggests that a fund’s size may influence the probability of media coverage for that 
fund. I explore this further when examining the determinants of media coverage later in 
the dissertation. Figure 1 shows that the average total net assets under management 
increases from under $750 million in 1994 to almost $3 trillion in 2000. This is consistent 
with changes in mutual fund assets in general over the sample period.13 
On average, over the sample period, the monthly flows into these funds are a little 
over 1% of their total net assets, as can be seen in Panel A of Table 1. The variation 
across the funds is large, ranging from a negative monthly flow of 2.7% at the tenth 
percentile to a positive monthly flow of 4.3% at the ninetieth percentile. The average 
                                                 




flow for funds in the news is distinctly greater than the average flow for funds not in the 
news, with the t-statistic for the difference in the means significant at the 1% level. In 
fact, the median fund without media coverage receives no net flows in that month. The 
difference between funds with and without media coverage is more obvious at the higher 
end (see the numbers for the 90th percentile) for both fund size and fund flow variables.  
As can be seen from Figure 2, the sample funds experienced negative outflows 
towards the latter part of the sample period. In 1998 U.S. stock indexes experienced their 
largest intrayear declines since 1990 and net new cash flow to equity funds slowed to 
$157 billion in 1998 from $227 billion in 1997.14 While equity funds enjoyed slightly 
better net new cash inflows in 1999, it was still lower than the 1997 level. Funds with 
objective of ‘Growth & Income’ saw net new cash flow drop from $84 billion in 1997 to 
$31 billion in 1999 and experienced a net cash outflow of $32 billion in 2000.15 Further, 
the net flows across individual domestic equity funds were more concentrated than 
normal, with 90 percent of domestic funds experiencing a combined net outflow of $109 
billion.16 While net new cash flow to equity funds rose in 2000, the bulk of the inflow 
was posted in the first quarter of the year, and flows slowed markedly as the year 
progressed.17  This was largely on account of domestic equity markets experiencing their 
sharpest correction in many years. 56 percent of all stocks listed on U.S. exchanges 
declined in 1999. The NASDAQ declined 40 percent in 2000, the S&P index dropped 10 
percent, and the Dow Jones industrial index fell 6 percent.18 Additionally, the smaller 
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percentage flows to funds in the second half of the sample period is consistent with 
increasing assets under management as shown in Figure 1.  
Figure 3 depicts the temporal changes in total monthly return for the mutual funds 
in my sample. The monthly returns on the funds average 1.26% over my sample period, 
with a range from the tenth to the ninetieth percentile between –4.14% to 6.42% per 
month, as shown in Panel A of Table 1.  Panel B shows that there is no significant 
difference in the in the mean monthly return between the funds with and without media 
coverage. The distribution of expense ratios is substantially tighter with an average of 
1.27% of total net assets. The mean expense ratio is higher for funds with media coverage 
than funds without media coverage, and the t-statistic for the difference is significant at 
the 1% level. This difference is more pronounced at the higher end, as shown by the 
numbers for the 90th percentile. The average across the load fees is 2.09%, with the 
median fund having a higher load fee of 3.91%. 
The age of the funds in my sample ranges from 3 years at the tenth percentile to 
41 years at the ninetieth percentile with the average age over 15 years. Panel B of Table 1 
shows that the average age for funds with news articles is 22.54 years while the average 
age for funds without news coverage is 13.85 years, with the t-statistic for the difference 
in the two means being highly significant. This suggests that older funds are more likely 
to receive media coverage than younger funds. This influence is part of the learning 
effects of media coverage and I explore this further when examining the relationship 
between age and media coverage later in the dissertation. This difference in age seems to 
span the entire range of fund age, with the proportion of the fund age statistic for the two 





NEWS DATA  
The news data is a unique database of nearly 10,000 news stories built specifically 
for the purpose of this study. I searched for mentions of the 286 funds in my sample in 12 
major publications through the Dow Jones Retrieval Service (now called Factiva) for the 
1994-2000 sample period. In the daily publications are included the highest circulation 
newspapers with the largest number of stories about mutual funds available from Factiva, 
as can be seen by the circulation numbers provided in Table 2.   For the weekly or 
monthly publications, I include four major business publications (Barron’s, Business 
Week, Forbes and Fortune), one national news magazine (U.S. News and World Report), 
and one personal finance magazine (Money), each of which had the largest number of 
stories about mutual funds in their category. From the 12 publications, I locate a total of 
9,984 articles that mention the funds in my sample and these news articles are further 
classified as detailed in the following section. 
 
Methodology of Classification of News Articles 
I personally collected and classified around a third of the news articles in the 
database. I also trained and supervised a team of 6 research assistants to help in the 
collection and classification of the remaining news articles. I individually trained and 
monitored each member of the team for a significant period of time. After each member 
was fully trained, I would assign funds for which they were to search and classify news 




reclassified them to ensure total compliance with the training given. Please see Appendix 
B for an elaboration of the training methodology. Each of the 9,984 news articles was 
read and subsequently classified in terms of a given set of characteristics. The 
classification and the corresponding characteristics of the news articles were then entered 
in a spreadsheet.  These are detailed in Appendix B.  
The classification of the news articles is primarily on two fronts: tone and type. 
The tone of the news articles range from Positive to Negative with Neutral in the middle. 
News articles that portray a fund in a clearly positive (negative) light are classified as 
Positive (Negative). News articles that exhibit a marginal positive (negative) posture 
towards the fund are classified as Neutral- Positive (Neutral- Negative). News articles 
that do not exhibit any posture towards the fund are classified as Neutral.  
The classification of the type of news article is determined by the extent of the 
portrayal of the fund rather than the posture as in the case of the tone classification. The 
type of news article is classified in the following order. First, it is seen if the article can 
be classified as a Feature. If an article focuses on a fund to the extent that a considerable 
portion, if not all, of the article portrays the fund, then the article is classified as a 
Feature.  If bulk of the article does not focus on the fund, but the article details an 
interview, usually with a fund manager, then it is classified as an Interview.  
If an article does not qualify as a Feature or an Interview, then the next two types 
to be considered are related to the return performance of the fund. If the fund is assigned 
a numerical ranking anywhere in the text or table section of the news story, then the story 
is classified a Ranking type. If the article discusses the fund’s performance but does not 




If a news story does not qualify for any of the above types of classification and 
merely mentions the fund in a non-performance context, then the news story is classified 
as Mention. When the fund is mentioned nowhere in the text part of the article and only 
appears in a table (without a numerical ranking), then the article is classified as a Tables 
type. 
 
Variables of News Data 
I build on the above classification of news articles to construct the other news 
variables. The basic news variables are of two kinds: 
• News flag or dummy variables to represent the existence of media coverage  
• News count variables to represent the amount of media coverage  
The two kinds of news variables provide different measures of media coverage. 
The news flag or dummy variable is a simple tool to study the impact of the existence of 
media coverage. For example, it can be employed in a regression model to test for 
whether mutual funds enjoy enhanced fund flows on account of being portrayed in the 
news media. The news count variable, on the other hand, provides a measure of the extent 
or amount of media coverage. The motivation for this is to capture the additional effect of 
the strength of media coverage by including the actual number of news stories portraying 
the fund during a given month. To draw a parallel, the dummy variables capture the 
effect for if media coverage exists, while the news count variables capture the effect for 




An article flag variable represents the existence of any media coverage while 
separate flag variables represent the posture of the article towards the fund. A positive 
flag denotes the existence of news articles classified as Positive or Neutral-Positive while 
a negative flag denotes the existence of news articles classified as Negative or Neutral-
Negative. The Neutral flag comprises solely of Neutral articles. The news count variables 
are constructed along similar lines. The total article count is the sum of all articles for 
fund i in period t. The positive (negative) count is the sum of the number of Positive and 
Neutral- Positive (Negative and Neutral-Negative) news stories for the fund in the month. 
The Neutral count variable is simply the number of Neutral articles for a given fund in a 
given month.  
Additionally, there are two special count variables given by: 
• Cumulative Article Count, which is the cumulative number of news articles 
for each fund since the start of the sample period (January 1994). The higher 
the cumulative article count, the more well known the fund can be said to be. 






ARTC , where  
    t = 1 is the first period in the sample (Jan 1994) 
    t = n is the current period 
• Circulation news variable, which is the circulation-weighted measure of media 
coverage. This variable incorporates a measure of the reach of media coverage 
along with the amount of media coverage, thereby forming a good tool to 
















tij  , where 
   Aj,i,t = # articles in periodical  j for fund i in period t 
   Cj = circulation of periodical  j  
 
Descriptive Statistics of News Data 
Table 3 provides the frequency distribution of news articles collected and 
classified uniquely for this research. Panel A shows the list of publication sources as well 
as the number of articles from each publication.  The 12 publications yield a total of 
9,984 articles that at least mention the 286 funds in my sample.  Of these, 62% come 
from daily publications and 38% come from weekly or monthly publications.  In terms of 
individual publications, the Wall Street Journal carries the largest percentage of the 
articles regarding the sample funds (30.98%), followed by USA Today (14.29%), 
Barron’s (13.85%) and the Boston Globe (10.25%).    
Figure 4A presents a temporal depiction of the probability of a fund receiving 
media coverage. The graph does not appear to display a significant trend across time. 
When examined within each year, however, a quarterly trend emerges. Figure 4B charts 
the seasonality across months in the probability of media coverage and confirms the 
aforementioned trend. The trend is that the probability of a mutual fund being portrayed 
in a news story spikes up at the beginning of each quarter. This is likely associated with 
the quarterly release of mutual fund performance data. Many statistics associated with 




usually results in many stories at the beginning of each quarter that analyze the mutual 
fund performance in the preceding quarter, and some predictions for the quarter ahead.  
Each of the 9,984 news articles in my database is classified in terms of its posture 
toward the fund, as described in the previous section.  The results of the classifications 
are shown in Panels B and C of Table 3.  Although the majority of articles are simply 
neutral, Panel B shows that an asymmetry exists in the posture of the articles with a 
substantially greater proportion being classified as positive or neutral-positive as 
compared to negative or neutral-negative.  That is, over my sample period, a news article 
is almost thrice as likely to have mentioned a fund in a positive rather than negative light.  
There are at least three potential interpretations of these results.  First, it could be 
that more positive than negative news about growth funds occurred naturally over my 
sample period, which encompasses a bull market for the majority of the period. I test this 
by conducting a study of the impact of fund performance on media coverage. The 
analysis is described in detail in Chapter 5. I find that the fund’s performance over the 
previous year has a significant impact on the posture of media coverage received by the 
fund. I find a significantly higher proportion of positive news stories when funds have 
performed well and more negative news stories when funds perform below par. These 
results support the hypothesis that the higher proportion of positive media coverage for 
my sample may be driven by a bull market for the majority of the sample period. 
An alternative interpretation would be similar to the hypotheses regarding 
analysts’ bias in forecasting earnings estimates (or recommendations), where reporters 




company.19  A third interpretation has been suggested by Reuter and Zitzewitz (2004) 
who maintain that some financial publications that accept advertising from mutual funds 
are more likely to provide positive recommendations for the advertised funds. This last 
possible interpretation is unlikely to explain the results seen in my study as Reuter and 
Zitzewitz (2004) focus on recommendations from six newspapers and personal finance 
magazines: Wall Street Journal, Money, New York Times, Kiplinger’s Personal Finance, 
Smart Money and Consumer Reports. Their results derive from the personal finance 
magazines, of which I have only one (Money) out of the 12 publications covered by my 
sample.   
Figures 5A-5C present a temporal depiction of the frequency of media coverage 
received by the funds in the sample. Each chart highlights a specific posture of the media 
coverage. Figures 6A-6C present the seasonality across months in the frequency of the 
funds receiving positive, neutral and negative media coverage respectively. Similar to the 
probability of any news story, these charts also display a quarterly trend. The frequency 
of the funds being portrayed in news stories with positive/neutral/negative posture spikes 
up at the beginning of each quarter. These charts likely capture the same phenomenon 
resulting from release of mutual fund data at the end of every quarter that is discussed 
earlier in this section. 
In terms of types of stories, Panel C of Table 3 shows that 6.42% of the news 
articles are feature stories about the fund or contain an interview with the fund manager, 
and 7.7% are articles about fund performance or contain numerical ranking of mutual 
                                                 
19 The argument is that analysts positively bias their forecasts and recommendations in order to stay on 
friendly terms with firm management, thus, allowing the analysts continued access to senior management. 





funds, usually with regard to performance or assets.  In the majority of articles (85.88%) 
the fund was just mentioned or included in a table. Figures 7A-7F present a temporal 
depiction of the frequency of media coverage received by the funds in the sample. Each 
chart highlights a specific type of the media coverage. Figures 8A-8F present the 
seasonality across months in the frequency of each type of media coverage portraying the 
funds in the sample. While the charts more or less portray the quarterly trend of Figures 4 
and 6, Figures 8A and 8B show that more news stories are written about fund 
performance and contain numerical ranking of mutual funds in the first quarter than any 
other quarter. Figures 8E and 8F show that news articles that are feature stories or 
interviews with fund managers are more spread out across all the months. 
Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics of news articles. Panel A shows that for 
any fund, having a news article is not common given that on average, less than 20% of 
the funds have at least one news article per month.  It is even less common for a fund to 
have an article with a positive or negative tone. On average, 10% of the funds have 
positive articles in a month and only 4% have negative articles. Panel B of the table 
shows the frequency of the media coverage for the individual funds on a monthly basis, 
by the posture of the article towards the fund. On average, a fund has 0.42 article per 
month and half the articles do not portray the fund in a strongly positive or negative light. 
The median fund has no articles about it in a given month. 
Panel B of Table 4 shows that the maximum number of articles for a fund in a 
month is 24. These articles portray Vanguard’s S&P 500 Index fund. This level of media 
coverage occurred at two different times during the sample period, March 1997 and 




index fund (net inflows of $2.99 billion) and the high returns on the index, with only 8% 
of mutual funds earning better returns in the first quarter. The August 1997 articles were 
apparently a result of Fidelity Magellan’s announcement that they intended to close to 
new investors.  As the Vanguard index fund was the largest rival, much of the news 
centered on the expected effects to that fund.  Despite such a large number of articles, 22 
of the 24 articles on the Vanguard S&P 500 Index fund that occurred in August 1997 
were classified as neutral articles.  The finding that the Vanguard S&P 500 Index fund is 
the most mentioned fund in a month should not be surprising since it is one of the largest 
funds in the sample period. 
A similar examination of the funds with the largest number of positive or negative 
articles in a given month suggests that return performance affects the probability of news 
coverage.  Panel B shows that the largest number of news stories in a month that depict a 
fund in a positive or negative light are 12 and 9 respectively. The fund with the largest 
number of positive articles in any month in my sample period was Alger Funds’ Capital 
Appreciation Portfolio, which had 12 positive articles in July 1995. These articles 
primarily discussed the fund’s high percentage holdings in the technology sector and its 
consequent high performance due to the increases in prices in that sector.  The fund with 
the largest number of negative articles in a month was Frontier Equity Fund Portfolio.  
The nine negative articles in October 1998 focused on this fund’s position as the worst 
performing fund over the previous 5 years.  
The preceding discussion suggests that fund characteristics, such as size and 
performance, seem to exert an influence on the media coverage received by the fund. The 





Media Coverage and Fund Characteristics 
In this chapter, I study the contribution of fund characteristics that influence the 
visibility of mutual funds. I conduct several analyses to empirically examine the impact 
of the fund characteristics on media coverage of the funds. I start with an economic 
analysis of the expected important factors that influence media coverage. I then employ 
univariate analyses to study the direct relationship of each factor with media coverage. 
Finally, I conduct a multivariate probit analysis to study the determinants of media 
coverage.  
Evidence suggests that certain funds garner greater media coverage than others. 
Sirri and Tufano (1998) posit that larger funds, those with extreme (high or low) 
performance, and those with more volatile returns are more likely to be covered by the 
media. They find that, as expected, sheer media coverage is higher for larger funds and 
funds with more volatile returns. They also use fund complex size as a measure of search 
costs assuming that larger complexes are more visible and have greater brand awareness 
than smaller fund complexes. The individual investor is likely to be better off in a large 
fund that is a member of a large fund family. Previous studies have examined the effect 




visibility and reducing investment barriers, thereby making it easier for the fund to attract 
new investors.20  
Prior work has established that mutual funds exhibit economies of scale.21 Scale 
economies are exhibited in any industry when the fixed costs of running the firm can be 
allocated over a larger plant size or, in the case of mutual fund management groups, over 
more dollars of assets under management. If there are fixed costs associated with running 
mutual funds, then the larger funds have more assets over which those costs can be 
allocated.  The benefit of economies of scale can then be passed along to shareholders as 
lower expense ratios. The increased stability of the fund also decreases expenses because 
of reduced transaction costs, since the fund need not buy and sell as frequently to meet 
redemptions. A stable and fast-growing fund may also be able to negotiate more 
favorable terms for its contractual relations. Assets under management can grow by 
attracting new money or posting strong returns. Successful funds that have received large 
inflows of investment are likely to find it easier to attract additional capital from 
investors.  Thus, it is reasonable to expect that larger firms would tend to receive a 
greater level of media attention. I test this implication with my data and find evidence to 
support it. I present the analysis later in this chapter.  
Mutual funds more frequently mentioned in newspapers and magazines are more 
likely to be well-recognized by consumers. Funds receiving media attention are also more 
likely to grow faster and have a stronger performance-flow relationship. A number of 
previous studies have established that mutual fund investors chase performance.22 Flows 
                                                 
20 Huang et al. (2006), Dowen and Mann (2004). 
21 Baumol et al. (1990), Malhotra and McLeod (1997) 




into and out of mutual funds are seen to be strongly related to lagged measures of excess 
returns. Berk and Green (2004) model investors that chase performance and make full 
rational use of information about funds' histories in doing so. 
Sirri and Tufano (1998) find that the media seem to treat good and bad performers 
almost equally. This may be attributed in part to their measure of media attention 
indicating the sheer information flow about a fund, rather than positive, negative or 
neutral news about the fund. Their results suggest a U-shaped relationship between 
performance and media attention. Extreme performance - whether high or low - gets 
media attention, and almost at the same rate. A fund or a stock that soars or dives catches 
peoples’ attention. It is a matter of routine for news agencies to report the prior day’s big 
winners and big losers. Barber and Odean (2004) find that individual investors tend to be 
net purchasers of stocks on high attention days, following extreme price moves. Investors 
are likely to notice when stocks have extreme one day returns. Such returns, whether 
positive or negative, will most often be associated with news about the firm. The news 
driving extreme performance will catch the attention of some investors, while the 
extreme return itself will catch the attention of others. Even in the absence of other 
information, extreme returns can become news themselves. The Wall Street Journal 
regularly reports the previous day’s top gainers and losers. 
Thus, I propose that it is reasonable to expect funds with extreme performance to 
attract greater media attention. I also posit that extreme high performance will garner 
more media coverage exhibiting the fund in a positive light, while extreme low 




evidence in support of them. I present the results along with a detailed analysis later in 
the chapter. 
It follows from the above analysis that funds with higher volatility of returns will 
garner a higher share of media attention. Huang et al. (forthcoming JF) find that investors 
recognize and respond to risk levels of fund performance when allocating their wealth 
among funds. Sirri and Tufano (1998) find that media coverage is higher for funds with 
more volatile returns. Funds with extreme performance are more likely to have volatile 
returns, and thus more likely to attract the attention of the media. While the overall media 
coverage is likely to be higher for funds with volatile returns, I do not expect all media 
coverage to respond in the same manner to return volatility. Return volatility is widely 
used as a measure of risk, and risk is not regarded as a desirable characteristic when 
considering an investment. Hence, I propose that return volatility is likely to result in 
more news articles with a negative portrayal of the fund than a positive slant. I test these 
hypotheses and find that return volatility does increase the propensity for a fund to 
receive media coverage. In particular, volatility plays a strong and significant role for 
negative media coverage.  
I thus identify the three fund characteristics that are likely to be key determinants 
of media coverage of mutual funds. In the next step, I study the direct relationship of each 
of these factors with media coverage, and then proceed to a multivariate analysis of the 






Media Coverage and Fund Size  
As highlighted by the discussion above, one would expect larger funds to be more 
heavily followed as they have more shareholders, implying that a larger proportion of the 
publications’ readers could be that fund’s shareholders and consequently have an interest 
in the news story.  Table 5 shows that there is a 42% correlation between a fund’s total 
net asset value and the average number of total news articles about the fund per month. 
To determine whether fund size influences media coverage, I divide the funds into 
size quintiles after sorting by the fund’s total net assets.  For each size quintile, I then 
calculate the average number of articles per month. As Panel A of Table 6 shows, being a 
large fund greatly increases the probability of media coverage.  The largest funds have an 
average of more than one article per month, which is around four times as many articles 
as the other quintiles.  The impact of fund size on the amount of media coverage received 
by the fund is most striking in the case of articles with a positive tone. Funds in the 
largest size quintile receive almost six times the amount of positive media coverage than 
funds in the smallest size quintile.   
In contrast, the relation between fund size and negative articles is in the opposite 
direction. Funds in the smallest size quintile have the largest number of negative articles, 
and this is twice the average number of negative articles for the funds in the largest size 
quintile. The table further shows that being in the largest size quintile also helps in 
garnering the lion’s share of neutral news articles as well. This is confirmed by the 




month was 22 and this occurred in August 1997 for Vanguard S&P 500 Index fund, one 
of the largest funds in my sample.   
 
Media Coverage and Fund Performance    
To determine whether fund performance influences media coverage, I divide the 
funds into performance quintiles after sorting by the fund’s total return for the previous 
year.  For each performance quintile, I then calculate the average number of articles per 
month. As Panel B of Table 6 shows, being a good performer greatly increases the 
probability of media coverage.  Again, the impact of fund performance on the amount of 
media coverage received by the fund is most striking in the case of articles with a positive 
tone. Funds in the highest performance quintile receive almost four times the amount of 
positive media coverage than funds in the lowest performance quintile, and nearly twice 
that of the other quintiles.  
Looking at the other side of the coin, being a poor performer draws its own share 
of publicity, though hardly flattering. Funds in the lowest performance quintile have the 
largest number of negative articles, and this is more than thrice the average number of 
negative articles for the funds in the highest performance quintile. This suggests that fund 
performance plays a key role in determining the posture of the media coverage received 
by the fund. In contrast to the case of fund size, fund performance does not seem to have 
a strong impact on media coverage that has no posture. The average number of neutral 
articles is marginally higher for the best performers and does not vary significantly across 




I conduct a study to specifically test the impact of fund performance on the 
posture of media coverage. I divide my sample into positive and negative bins based on 
whether past fund performance was positive or negative. Then for each bin, I obtain the 
proportion of news stories that are positive and the proportion of news stories that are 
negative. I repeat this process for two horizons of past performance: previous month’s 
return and previous year’s return. The results of this analysis are provided in Panel A of 
Table 7. For the positive bins, the proportion of positive news articles is stable at around 
40% across both horizons of fund return, as is the proportion of negative news articles at 
the 10% level. The negative bins display a different pattern. For a shorter horizon, the 
proportion of positive news articles still dominates the proportion of negative news 
articles. However, the negative bin for previous year’s return displays an inverse pattern 
– the proportion of negative news articles soars to 40% while the proportion of positive 
news articles drops to 11%. This is consistent with the results from the multivariate 
analysis discussed later in the chapter, where I show that the previous year’s return has a 
significant impact on the probability of a fund receiving positive or negative media 
coverage.   
I posit that the anomaly of higher proportion of positive news stories for the 
negative bin of previous month’s return can be attributed to the combined influence of 
two factors: the weaker influence of previous month’s return in comparison to previous 
year’s return, and the powerful influence of fund size on positive media coverage. To test 
this hypothesis, I obtain the smaller half of the sample by restricting the fund total net 
assets (TNA) to below the median fund TNA. I then repeat the process of separating 




proportions of positive and negative news stories. The results of this test are provided in 
Panel B of Table 7. I find evidence in support of my hypothesis. By restricting the sample 
to smaller funds, I exclude the phenomenon associated with large funds attracting more 
positive media coverage. I now find that the negative bin for previous month’s return has 
a higher proportion of negative news stories than positive news stories. Further, I find 
that the disparity in the positive versus negative posture of media coverage is weaker for 
the shorter horizon of past performance. This is consistent with the hypothesis of 
previous month’s return exerting a weaker influence on the posture of media coverage in 
comparison to previous year’s return, which will be further confirmed by the multivariate 
analysis discussed later in the chapter. 
A comparison of the two panels of Table 7 yields another insight into the 
interplay between fund size and performance with regard to media coverage. Positive 
performance over any horizon is rewarded by positive media coverage, irrespective of 
fund size. The media treats small firms equally well, as long as they have performed well. 
When it comes to negative performance however, small funds bear the brunt of the media 
criticism. Comparing the negative bins for the previous month’s return, I find that small 
funds are penalized for poor performance while larger funds do not seem to be hurt by 
their poor returns.  Comparing the negative bins for the previous year’s return, I find that 
small funds are penalized much more severely than the average fund in the sample. 
 
Media Coverage and Return Volatility    
Table 5 shows that there is a 4.8% correlation between a fund’s return volatility 




correlation of 14.9% correlation between a fund’s return volatility and the average 
number of negative news articles about the fund per month. This suggests that volatility 
of fund performance may play a significant role in influencing the media coverage of 
mutual funds. To study this relationship, I divide the funds into volatility quintiles after 
sorting by the volatility of the fund’s return for the previous year.  For each volatility 
quintile, I then calculate the average number of articles per month. The results are 
provided in Panel C of Table 6. Consistent with the hypothesis that overall media 
coverage is likely to be higher for funds with volatile returns, I find that the average 
number of news stories for the highest volatility quintile is nearly twice the average 
number for the other quintiles. The highest volatility quintile draws greater numbers of 
positive and neutral news stories as well. Consistent with the concept of return volatility 
as a measure of risk, funds in the highest volatility quintile received thrice as many 
negative news articles as the average of funds in all other volatility quintiles. The 
stronger impact of return volatility on negative media coverage is further confirmed by 
the multivariate analysis discussed in the following section. 
The above univariate analyses identify fund size, performance and volatility as 
fund characteristics that seem to impact the probability of the fund receiving media 
coverage. I now turn to multivariate analyses to further explore the relationship between 
fund characteristics and media coverage of mutual funds. 
 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 I run several probit regressions to examine the fund characteristics that 




and include fund size, past return performance measures, and return volatility as 
independent variables in these regressions. I also construct a Small dummy variable that 
equals one if the fund’s size (as measured by its total net assets) is smaller than the 
median fund size of the sample, and zero otherwise.  This dummy variable is interacted 
with the fund return for previous year. I run the regressions using different categories of 
media coverage as the dependent variable. Table 8 provides the key results from these 
tests.  In Model 1, I examine the influence of the fund characteristics on the probability of 
any news story.  That is, the dependent variable is 1 if the fund had any news article 
appearing for that month and 0 otherwise.  In Models 2 and 3, I examine the probability 
of news coverage according to the tone of the coverage, with the focus in Model 2 being 
on the probability of a positive news story and the focus in Model 3 being on the 
probability of a negative news story.   
The results across all three models of Table 8 show that fund size is an important 
determinant of media coverage. In the case of Models 1 and 2, the probability of a news 
story appearing about a particular fund increases in the size of the fund.  That is, larger 
funds have a higher likelihood of receiving any kind of media coverage and there is a 
higher likelihood that the media coverage will be in a positive light. In the case of Model 
3, the probability of a negative news story appearing about a particular fund decreases in 
the size of the fund. These results are consistent with the results from Table 6 discussed 
earlier. The results also indicate that the impact of fund size seems to be strongest for 
positive news stories, followed closely by the overall media coverage. Fund size does not 




I include return performance over two horizons to fully capture the influence of 
fund performance on media coverage. Previous month’s fund return influences the 
probability of overall media coverage, but does not seem to play a significant role when it 
comes to the posture of the news stories. Return performance over the previous year 
seems to have a stronger effect, in terms of economic and statistical significance, on the 
probability of a positive or negative news story in comparison to the probability of a 
news mention in general.  Consistent with results from Table 7, the probability of a 
positive news story is increasing in the previous year’s return while the probability of a 
negative news story is decreasing in the previous year’s return. This suggests that news 
articles that show a positive or negative posture with regard to a fund tend to take into 
consideration a fund’s performance over a longer horizon before taking a stance on the 
fund’s performance.  
The interaction term between the Small dummy and the previous year’s return is 
strongly significant across all three models. In Model 1, being a small fund weakens the 
probability of overall media coverage, negating the weakly positive impact of previous 
year’s return. In the case of Model 2, the interaction term is positive. This implies that the 
incremental impact of better performance on the probability of positive media coverage is 
higher for a small fund. It is thus more critical for a small fund to perform well in order to 
receive positive media coverage. The strongly negative coefficient for the interaction 
term in Model 3 indicates that it is extremely costly for a small fund to have performed 
badly for a year. Being small and having a bad year of performance are individually 




two factors, as signified by the interaction term, is lethal for a fund’s media coverage. 
This inference is consistent with the results from Table 7. 
The volatility of returns over the previous year is seen to have a strong positive 
influence on the probability of overall media coverage. The impact is slightly weaker for 
news stories with a positive posture, suggesting that return volatility is less desirable for a 
complimentary portrayal by the media as compared to an average news story. The much 
stronger impact of return volatility seen in Model 3 for negative news articles is 
indicative of the disfavor with which highly volatile fund returns are regarded by the 
media and mutual fund investors. This is consistent with return volatility being widely 
used as a measure of risk when evaluating an investment opportunity.  
This chapter has focused on the relationship between media coverage and mutual 
fund characteristics. The next chapter is dedicated to an in-depth analysis of the impact of 





Media Coverage and Fund Flows 
 
The results from the previous chapter provide evidence for the impact of mutual 
fund characteristics on media coverage of the fund. It is thus highly unlikely that all 
mutual funds have an equal probability of receiving media coverage. Previous research 
on determinants of fund flows has highlighted the influence of mutual fund 
characteristics on fund flows.23 Selection bias may occur when funds that are likely to 
receive media coverage also have a greater propensity to receive higher inflows. Then the 
positive effects of media coverage on mutual fund flows may be overstated. Propensity 
for attracting flows is in the error term of the fund flow regression and is correlated with 
media coverage.  
There are specific problems that arise when estimating a regression model with 
samples that may not be random. If the determination of which values of the dependent 
variable of a regression are to be observed is related to the unobservable error term in the 
regression, then methods such as ordinary least squares (OLS) are in general 
inappropriate. The key concern with non-random selection is that the inference based on 
the observed group may not extend to the unobserved group.  
                                                 





Selection bias can be thought of as a form of omitted variable bias.24 I will 
elaborate further on this while detailing the sample selection model later in the chapter. 
As the residual captures the effects of all omitted and imperfectly measured variables, 
any regressors that are correlated with the unmeasured or mismeasured factors will end 
up proxying for them. This is an issue because if a regressor ends up proxying for any 
important factors that are left out, one cannot interpret its estimated coefficient as the 
effect of that regressor per se, since it also captures part of the effect of the omitted or 
mismeasured variables. 
The selection bias problem is usually addressed by employing a sample selection 
model. In sample selection models, one or several dependent variables are observed when 
another variable takes certain values. The basic idea behind these models is to estimate 
the following pair of regressions. The first is a probit regression predicting the probability 
of selection. The second is usually a linear regression for the outcome of interest as a 
function of the selection variable, controlling for observable confounders. 
The selection bias arises if the (unobservable part of the) criterion to select into 
the sample is correlated with the (unobservable part of the) outcome of interest. Ideally 
there would be some explanatory variables in the selection regression that do not belong 
in the outcome regression. Strictly speaking, this is not necessary, but it helps to identify 
the effect of the selection on the outcome and makes the estimates more robust.  
As far as testing for selection bias is concerned, the diagnosis is also the cure. One 
can obtain an estimate of rho (ρ), the correlation between the error terms of the two 
equations, sigma (σ), the standard error of the outcome regression and lambda (λ = ρ*σ). 
                                                 




If ρ is positive (negative), then the estimated effect of selection from single-equation 
estimation will generally be biased away from zero (towards zero). If ρ=0 (or 
equivalently, if λ=0, since σ>0), there is no selection bias and one can present the single-
equation estimates. If ρ≠0, there is selection bias and one should present the estimates 
from the selection model instead.   
 
THE HECKMAN MODEL  
There are two approaches to the Heckman model, introduced by James J. 
Heckman in 1974 and 1976 respectively. Heckman (1974) derives the sample likelihood 
function for the model and presents estimates obtained from optimizing the likelihood 
function. Later, Heckman (1976) proposes a simple two-stage estimator that permits 
estimation of the model by least squares and probit analysis. He provides an empirical 
example to show that the estimator yields estimates close to those obtained from the 
previous maximum likelihood estimation. Heckman (1979) clarifies and extends the 
analysis in the previous (1976) paper and derives the asymptotic distribution of the 
simple estimator. The original models have subsequently been generalized, by Heckman 
and by others. In Appendix C, I describe the derivation of both approaches to the 
Heckman model in detail. A brief description of the Heckman model is provided here. 
The Heckman model can be defined by a set of two equations that describe the 
selection regression model (probit) and the outcome regression model (linear). The basic 
idea of the model is that the outcome variable is only observed if some criterion, defined 




propensity to be included in the sample. In the context of this dissertation, this is the 
propensity for a fund to receive media coverage. The outcome model estimates the 
expected value of fund flows (the variable of interest), conditional on being included in 
the sample and controlling for other major factors that affect flows.  
Heckman’s two-step procedure consists of first estimating the selection equation 
as a probit model. Using the probit results, the estimate of the inverse Mill's ratio or 
Hazard ratio (symbolized by λ) is computed for the sub sample for which the outcome 
variable is observed. Then, for this same sub sample, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
model is used to regress fund flows on other major factors that affect flows, with the 
estimate of λ as an additional explanatory variable. The two-step model explicitly 
addresses bias caused by correlation of the regressor with omitted variables, by adding a 
term to the least squares regression that represents the non-zero expectation of the error 
term. 
I present the derivation of the Heckman model in Appendix C and show that it is 
not the fact that observations on fund flows are only available for a selected sample of 
funds with media coverage that causes the difficulty in using the simple OLS approach. 
Rather, it is the fact that this selection of having media coverage is not random with 
respect to fund flows. The maximum likelihood approach requires the log-likelihood 
function to be specified. Then nonlinear optimization is used to maximize the likelihood 
function and calculate the standard errors of the estimates. The maximum likelihood 
estimates have the desirable properties of being consistent and asymptotically efficient. 
Therefore, I present results from the Heckman maximum likelihood model for the 




corresponding results from the Heckman two-step model in Appendix D. This provides a 
robustness test to ensure that the empirical results presented in this chapter are robust to 




If media coverage affects investor attention and learning about a fund, one would 
expect investors to change their fund holdings after the news event.  I test this implication 
by examining whether and what kind of effect media coverage has on investor flows into 
the fund, while controlling for other major factors that affect flows.  Given past evidence 
on determinants of fund flows (e.g., Ippolito, 1992; Gruber, 1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 
1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Del Guercio and Tkac, 2002), I control for several factors, 
including lag flows, fund size, past performance and fund expenses.  I also control for 
variation across time in the overall size of investor flows into mutual funds with a 
variable for aggregate market flow. The variable for aggregate market flows captures the 
mean investor flows into all the funds in my sample during the given period. Following 
my earlier analysis on the relationship between fund characteristics and media coverage, 
my selection model is similar to the probit analysis conducted in Chapter 5. I include the 
fund’s size, past performance measures and return volatility as determinants of the 
probability of media coverage in the selection regression. The definition for all the 
variables included in the regressions are presented in Chapter 4. 
My outcome regression model to examine the relation between the fund flows and 




Flowi,t  = f (Aggregate market flowst, Flowi,t-1, Log TNAi,t-1, Measures of past 
performancei, Expense ratio i,t-1, Fund Agei,t, News Variablesi,t). 
 
My selection regression model to predict the probability of selection is then as 
follows: 
Probability of media coveragei,t  = f (Log TNAi,t-1, Measures of past performancei, 
Return volatilityi) 
In this section, I state the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3, describe the setup of 
the tests for each hypothesis, and discuss the results for each test with reference to the 
respective tables. I have presented the results for the probit model in Table 8, and hence 
do not repeat those results for each subsequent table. I present the coefficients and p-
values for the variables in the outcome regression of interest for the Heckman maximum 
likelihood model. 
 
The depth and breadth of media coverage  
The theory on attention predicts that firms that are in the news are more likely to 
catch investors’ attention than those that are not. The EntreMed example presented in 
Chapter 1 highlights the point that even if news is publicly available, it is not 
incorporated into investment decisions until and unless investors pay attention. The most 
basic effect of media coverage is to simply make investors aware of funds that they had 
not previously considered. The increased awareness of mutual funds implies that 




coverage also reduces search costs for mutual fund investors and thus has a material 
impact on investor fund choices. 
The first hypothesis relates to the key premise for the research presented in this 
dissertation. It tests the basic question of whether media coverage influences fund flows 
while the other hypotheses cover the nature of this influence. Basically, the hypothesis 
states that: 
Hypothesis 1: Mutual funds with higher media coverage have greater fund flows. 
This hypothesis tests the overall impact of media coverage, and hence I use 
absolute values of fund flows as the independent variable in the regressions. Thus the 
first hypothesis tests whether overall media coverage, irrespective of its posture, results in 
greater absolute fund flows. The rest of the hypotheses take into consideration the posture 
of the media coverage and hence I use directional fund flows for the other regressions.  
I test the above hypothesis using two different measures of media coverage 
received by the fund. The first test uses the actual numbers of news stories portraying the 
fund each month, as a measure of the depth or strength of media coverage received by the 
fund. The results, presented in Model 1 of Table 9, show that having media coverage 
during a month has a significantly positive effect on fund flows. Monthly fund flows are 
increasing in the number of news articles. That is, funds that are portrayed in more news 
articles in a given month enjoy greater fund flows in absolute terms.25 
An implication that can be derived from the attention theory is that the more 
investors that are reached by the media outlet, the greater should be the effects on funds 
                                                 
25 To allow for the possibility of delay in investor reaction to news stories about the funds, I run the same 




flows.  Thus, I next examine whether coverage by media outlets with greater circulation 
has a greater impact on investor flows. This constitutes the second test for Hypothesis 1, 
using circulation-weighted numbers of news stories as a measure of the breadth or the 
reach of media coverage.  To do this, I run regressions similar to those in Model 1 in 
which the simple news count variable now is replaced with a weighted-circulation news 
count variable.  This variable takes the news count variable and weights it by the 
proportion of the circulation of each periodical to the total circulation of the twelve print 
periodicals.  
The results of this regression are provided in Model 2 of Table 9. The coefficients 
on the circulation-weighted news count variable show that there exists a stronger 
attention effect from having articles in the higher circulation periodicals.  Comparing he 
two models of Table 9, I find that the coefficient for the circulation-weighted news count 
variable is higher than the coefficient for the plain news count variable by a factor of ten. 
Consistent with the attention theory, I find that the larger the reach of the mode of 
attracting attention, the greater the potential for influence thereafter. These results are 
also consistent with the example provided by Huberman and Regev (2001), in which the 
same article attracted much greater attention and resulted in a much stronger impact on 
stock prices when reprinted in the New York Times than when originally printed in Nature 
Magazine.   
 
The good, the bad and the neutral 
A key influence of media is knowledge leading to investor learning. The cognitive 




I explore this aspect of learning empirically by examining the information content of the 
media coverage in terms of the posture of the news story, i.e., positive or negative slant in 
the article with regard to the fund. Investor learning from media coverage could also 
impact the fund's existing investors by leading them to reevaluate their current 
investments in such funds, resulting in either increased investments (in the case of a 
positive news story) or reduced investments (in the case of a negative news story). This 
can result in a significant impact on fund flows considering the finding by Alexander, 
Jones and Nigro (1998) that in choosing which mutual funds to purchase, 42% of the 
investors state that they rely on financial publications like newspapers and magazines for 
information about the funds. I specifically test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: News articles with positive or negative posture have a stronger 
impact on mutual fund flows than news articles with neutral tone or no posture. 
The results in Table 10 show that aggregate market flows, fund age, and past 
performance are important factors in the magnitude of the percentage flows into a fund.  
The greater the flows to funds in general, the greater the flows to the individual funds.   
The older funds have lower percentage flows as compared to newer funds.  Consistent 
with the previous evidence regarding the influence of past performance on fund flows 
(e.g., Del Guercio and Tkac, 2002), I find that the fund’s return performance in the 
previous year has a significantly positive effect on the current period’s flow.  I also find 
that flows are negatively related to the level of the expense ratio, suggesting that 
investors explicitly include fees in their assessments of funds. 
Model 1 includes dummy variables for whether the fund had news or not in a 




dummy variable for whether the fund has positive media coverage takes on the value of 
one if the fund had at least one positive news story in a given month, and a value of zero 
if the fund had no positive news story that month. Similar criteria apply to the other 
dummy variables for neutral and negative media coverage. The results for Model 1 show 
that having a positive news article in a period is associated with a significantly positive 
1.5% boost in fund flows, while having a negative news article results in a significantly 
negative 1% impact on fund flows.  The significance of these numbers is further 
highlighted by the consideration that the average fund flow for my sample is 1.08%.26 
This indicates that media coverage can have a very significant impact on mutual fund 
flows.  
Although the news articles could simply be informing investors about the fund’s 
recent return performance, since I control for performance in these regressions, the 
implication is that the news articles have an added effect.27  Further, even just a neutral 
mention of a fund can have a significant effect on flows, though weaker than the stories 
with posture, suggesting that the appearance of a fund in a news article may increase 
investor awareness, consistent with the Merton (1987) investor recognition hypothesis 
and the attention hypothesis.  These results suggest that investors learn about funds from 
media coverage. This is consistent with the finding in Alexander, Jones and Nigro (1998) 
that investors who rely on financial publications score higher on quizzes regarding their 
financial literacy.  
                                                 
26 The average fund flow for the smaller half of the sample, obtained by restricting the fund total net assets 
(TNA) to below the sample median, is 1.46%. Even this higher average flow is considered, the impact of 
media coverage is still significant. 




The results in Model 1 of Table 10 are based on indicator variables for whether 
the fund had news or not in a given period, with categorization of that news into positive, 
neutral or negative news. An additional issue is whether the frequency of the news 
articles has added effects on fund flows.  To address this, I run regressions similar to 
those in Model 1, but after replacing the indicator variables for the existence of news with 
count variables for the number of news articles. The motivation for this is to capture the 
additional effect of the strength of media coverage by including the actual number of 
news stories portraying the fund during a given month. To draw a parallel, the indicator 
variables capture the effect for if media coverage exists, while the news count variables 
capture the effect for how much media coverage the fund receives. In Model 2 of Table 
10, I provide separate counts for the number of positive, neutral or negative news articles 
portraying a fund in a period.  
The results in Model 2 are generally consistent with the results in Model 1. In the 
case of positive and neutral news stories, I find that besides increasing in the existence of 
media coverage, fund flows are increasing in the number of news articles as well.  That 
is, the more positive news articles about a fund in a given month, the greater the flows 
into the fund. The relationship between fund flows and media coverage is inverse in the 
case of negative news stories, with coefficient being equal in magnitude and significance. 
Fund flows are increasing in the number of neutral articles, but on a weaker note in 
comparison to the positive media coverage. This is particularly noteworthy given than 
neutral news stories comprise more than 50% of the total media coverage in my database, 
and yet have a much weaker influence on fund flows in comparison to positive and 




coverage that contains more information, measured by posture of the news story with 
regard to the fund portrayed, seems to have a greater impact on fund flows than media 
coverage with less information. 
 
Fund characteristics interact with media coverage  
I have shown in Chapter 5 that fund characteristics, such as fund size and past 
performance, influence the probability of media coverage. I now explore the possibility 
that in addition to their direct impact on fund flows, these fund characteristics also 
influence the effect of media coverage on fund flows. There is considerable finance 
literature on fund flows that provide evidence that determinants of fund flows include 
fund characteristics such as past performance and fund size. In addition to their direct 
impact on fund flows, I propose that these fund characteristics also impact the effect of 
media coverage on fund flows.  
I posit that better past performance will enhance the impact of positive news 
stories and diminish the impact of negative news stories on fund flow. Investors generally 
have a positive impression about a fund that has performed well. When these investors 
then come across media coverage portraying the fund in a positive light, it reinforces 
their positive impression about the fund. Hence, investors are likely to have a stronger 
response to a positive news story about a fund that has performed well, than a positive 
news story about a fund that has not done so well. In the case of fund size, I predict a 
smaller impact of news on flows of larger and well known funds in contrast to the more 
significant role played by news for smaller and lesser known funds. I have previously 




funds. Similar to the case of older funds, investors will have greater knowledge of large 
funds that have received considerable media coverage and hence the incremental impact 
of fresh news is likely to be smaller. These implications are captured formally in the 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Fund size and past performance influence the impact of media 
coverage on mutual fund flows. 
In Model 1 of Table 11, I interact the natural logarithm of total net assets under 
fund management for the previous period with the number of news articles in the current 
period. The results show that in spite of controlling for size of the fund, the interaction 
term is significant and has a negative coefficient. The smaller percentage flows resulting 
from news for the larger funds indicates that media coverage plays a more significant role 
for smaller and lesser known funds. I do a similar analysis for Model 2 of Table 11 where 
I provide separate counts by posture of media coverage in terms of the number of 
positive, neutral or negative news articles portraying a fund in a period. The interaction 
terms are negative and significant for positive and neutral media coverage, thereby 
implying that larger funds will have lesser percentage flows from positive and neutral 
media coverage than smaller funds.  The coefficient for negative media coverage is not 
significant implying that larger funds may not be as significantly impacted by negative 
media coverage.  
To test whether fund return exacerbates or mitigates the effects of media coverage 
on fund flows, I add interaction terms between the counts of news articles and the fund’s 
return performance over the previous year. In Model 1 of Table 12, I include the total 




significant for the number of news stories in general. The return and news variables on 
their own have positive signs while the interaction term of these two variables has a 
negative sign. The implication of this is clarified by the results in Model 2 of Table 12, 
where I include interaction terms between past performance and news variables with 
different postures towards the fund portrayed. I find that a fund’s return performance 
enhances the positive influence of positive media coverage.  That is, funds with positive 
return performance and positive media coverage have greater inflows, ceteris paribus, 
than funds with only positive return performance or only positive media coverage.  On 
the other hand, the interaction between return performance and media coverage for 
negative news stories is negative. These results are consistent with the earlier discussion 
in Chapter 5, particularly with the large negative coefficient for previous year’s return in 
the probit model for negative media coverage presented in Table 8.  
 
Media Coverage and Fund Age 
An implication that can be derived from the learning models is that as a fund ages 
and investors receive additional news about the fund, there are smaller effects from the 
news, on average.  There being greater learning potential for investors with regard to 
younger mutual funds, I hypothesize that media coverage has a greater impact for such 
funds than older well known funds. Specifically, I test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: As a fund ages and investors receive additional news about the fund, the 




Learning theory suggests that investors are likely to have better knowledge of 
older funds that have been around for a longer time. This implies that the impact of media 
coverage on flows is weaker for funds that are older and have a greater cumulative 
number of news stories. To test this implication, I provide the results of two sets of 
regressions that focus on the age of the fund in Table 13.   
In Model 1 of Table 13, I interact the age of a fund with the number of news 
articles in the current period. I also interact fund age with the cumulative number of news 
articles about the fund beginning in 1994, the start of my sample period. The results show 
that both the age and cumulative number of news articles variables have significant 
inverse relationships with fund flows, thereby lending direct support to Hypothesis 4. 
That is, older funds do not receive as high an inflow as do younger funds, even 
controlling for the differences in sizes between the funds. I find that the interaction term 
between the fund age and number of news articles is negative and significant. This result 
is consistent with the hypothesis that investors have knowledge of older funds that have 
been around for a longer time and hence the incremental impact of later news is smaller. 
For Model 2 of Table 13, in each period I divide the sample of funds into 3 
approximately equal-sized groups according to their age: young funds that have existed 6 
years or less, mid-age funds that have lives from 7 to 15 years, and older funds, with 
more than 15 years of existence. I construct dummy variables for the youngest and oldest 
groups in the regressions, omitting the middle group. I include the interaction terms 
between each dummy variable and the media coverage variables, namely, the current 
number of news articles and the cumulative number of news articles. The results show 




story is driven by the younger funds. The most significant impact occurs with the 
younger funds, which experience a 1.2% increase in flows from a news story. The news 
impact on the older funds is not significantly different from zero. The results in Table 13 
are consistent with both the attention and the learning theories in that the difference in 
flows due to news coverage between younger and older funds could be a result of the 
younger funds coming to the attention of investors, and there may be more for investors 
to learn about younger funds.   
 
 
Ranking articles: Test of Attention versus Learning Effects  
An implication of the attention theory is that conspicuous news events are more 
likely to wield a greater influence than the mundane, due to their increased visibility and 
ability to attract the attention of a larger population.  Klibanoff et al. (1998) find that the 
price of a closed-end country fund reacts more strongly to news about its fundamentals 
when the country whose stocks the fund holds appears on the front page of the 
newspaper. Specifically in terms of fund performance, probably the most conspicuous 
media coverage is when a fund is ranked as a top performer in a news article. Such news 
stories, where the fund is assigned a numerical ranking anywhere in the text or table 
section of the news story, are classified as Ranking articles.28 I employ the positive 
ranking articles in my database to construct a test for the attention effects of media 
coverage. 
                                                 




The previous hypotheses are consistent with both the attention and the learning 
theories. In order to differentiate between these theories, I devise a test in which I 
examine flow differences between two sets of matched funds. Each pair consists of two 
funds that are nearly identical in performance, but only one’s performance is mentioned 
in the press. I posit that a statistically significant difference in flows between the two 
funds will provide strong evidence for the attention effects of media coverage of mutual 
funds.  This leads to my final hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: A fund is more likely to catch the attention of investors when it 
makes a conspicuous appearance in the media, such as being portrayed with a numerical 
ranking.  
I conduct a test in which I examine flow differences between two sets of matched 
funds.  One fund in each pair is listed in a ranking article, while the other is not.  I then 
match the fund that is ranked, with another fund in my sample that is not listed in the 
ranking article. I match based on finding a non-ranked fund with the closest return, as 
long as its return for the previous year is within 50 basis points (0.005) of the ranked 
fund.  Thus, I have two funds that are nearly identical in performance, but only one’s 
performance is mentioned conspicuously in the press.   
The results of this test are shown in Table 14.  The average annual returns of the 
funds are 15.15% for the ranked funds and 15.01% for the non-ranked funds, a difference 
that is not significantly different from zero at any probability level given the t-statistic of 
0.07.  Yet the funds that are mentioned in the ranking articles have inflows in the month 
of the article averaging 3.4%, while the unmentioned funds have inflows averaging 




differences in variances between the two groups of funds, the t-statistic is 3.61.  This test 
provides strong evidence of the attention effect of media coverage.  It also supports the 
hypothesis that attention effects are important in investors’ selection of mutual funds. 
In summary, I examine an underlying tenet of attention and learning models of 
mutual fund investors by examining sources of attention and learning, namely, news 
stories about funds.  Specifically I examine whether media coverage of a mutual fund 
appears to affect investor learning and whether that learning is then manifested through 
changes in investment in the fund.  I find that media coverage of mutual funds has a 
significant effect on investor flows to the fund.  Further, it is evident that the media 
coverage affects investor learning in that not all news coverage is beneficial for fund 
flows.  Having a negative news article on average reduces net fund flows.  These results 
are consistent with the hypothesis that investors learn about funds through media 
coverage and that this knowledge affects their investment behavior.  Finally, I conduct a 
test to differentiate between the attention and learning effects of media coverage and find 
strong evidence supporting the key role played by attention effects of media coverage of 






I present some robustness tests to determine the sensitivity of the empirical results 
to the specification of the Heckman selection model.  I consider alternate specifications 
of the regressions presented in the previous chapter. I employ the piecewise linear 
specification for the fund flow-performance relation. I also separate out the index funds 
in my sample to test for any difference in the influence of media coverage for these 
funds. I run separate regressions for the sub samples of index and non-index funds. I also 
run separate regressions for news stories appearing in The Wall Street Journal, and news 
stories appearing in all other publications in order to test for publication-specific 
phenomena. Finally, I present results from Granger causality tests run on vector auto 
regression models of past fund flows and past media coverage. 
In Chapter 6, I employ the Heckman maximum likelihood model to account for 
the potential endogeneity in the relationship between media coverage of mutual funds and 
mutual fund flows. I also run corresponding regressions employing the Heckman two-
step model to ensure that the empirical results are robust to the alternate approach of the 
Heckman selection model. I present these results in Appendix D. I conduct an additional 
robustness check on the results using another alternate specification of the regression 
model. I find that the economic and statistic significance of the news variables are robust 




Previous studies have suggested a nonlinear specification for the fund flow-
performance relation.29 Hence, I adopt the Sirri and Tufano (1998) piecewise linear 
specification for return performance to conduct the robustness test. I employ the 
piecewise linear specification using cross-sectional regressions on a monthly basis and 
assuming that the kinks are identical across the months. The results from the cross-
sectional regressions for each month are then subjected to the Fama-Macbeth (1973) 
technique to aggregate the coefficients across the 84 months of my sample period. The 
advantage of using the Fama-Macbeth method for a pooled time-series data is that it 
controls for seasonality in media coverage. The seasonality of news stories in my dataset 
is depicted in Figures 4, 6 and 8. 
The results for the piecewise linear specification are presented in Tables 15 and 
16. The models in Table 15 portray overall media coverage while the regressions in Table 
16 allow for the different postures of the media coverage.  Table 15 shows that both the 
indicator variable in Model 1 and the news count variable in Model 2 have significant 
impact on mutual fund flows. Consistent with the empirical results presented in Chapter 
6, the results in Table 16 display the strong positive impact of positive media coverage 
and the strong negative impact of negative media coverage. The neutral news stories with 
no specific posture towards the fund also have a positive impact of fund flows, as seen in 
the earlier results. This confirms that the results for the empirical analysis of the fund 
flow-media coverage relationship are robust to alternate specifications of the model. 
The other robustness test involves separating out the index funds in the sample. 
Results for a sub sample of non-index funds may deviate from the full sample results as 
                                                 




media coverage may exert a stronger influence on non-index funds. To test whether 
inclusion of index funds has an impact on the empirical analysis presented earlier, I run 
the Heckman model regressions on sub samples of index and non-index funds. The 
results for the sub sample of index funds are presented in Tables 17 to 20 and display 
predictable characteristics such as loss of significance of past performance. It can be seen 
from these tables that only positive media coverage seems to have a significant impact on 
flows for index funds, and only the interactions with fund size is significant and not those 
with fund return. The results for regressions considering fund age are presented in Table 
20 and show that the cumulative news article count is not significant for the index funds 
but the dummy variable for older funds is significant when interacted with the cumulative 
news variable. These results seem to be largely driven by Vanguard mutual funds which 
garner nearly 80% of the media coverage for the index funds. Moreover, over my sample 
period, the positive news stories for Vanguard outnumber the negative news stories by a 
factor of 10. This would contribute to the dominance of positive media coverage for large 
funds displayed by the index funds results. The corresponding results for the non-index 
sub sample are presented in Tables 21 to 24. These results are almost identical to the 
results for the full sample.  This can be attributed to the fact that only 10% of the sample 
is comprised of index funds.  
Further, to control for readership, circulation and other aspects specific to 
publications, I run the Heckman model regressions for two sub samples: the first sub 
sample is restricted to news articles appearing in The Wall Street Journal and the second 
sub sample includes news articles appearing in the other eleven publications. I find that 




Not surprisingly, the results suggest that the Wall Street Journal exerts a stronger 
influence on fund flows than the other publications. I also find that the mean fund size for 
the first sub sample is more than thrice the mean fund size for the second sub sample, 
indicating that the Wall Street Journal focuses more on larger funds. 
The final robustness test involves the causality between mutual fund flows and 
media coverage. The empirical analysis presented earlier is based on causality from 
media coverage to fund flows. To confirm the correct direction of the causality, I employ 
vector auto regressions to conduct a test on the relation between media coverage and fund 
flows. Granger causality tests take into account the lagged values of the two series. The 
basic premise of a Granger causality test is to test whether variable x granger-causes 
variable y, that is, whether x leads y after controlling for past values of y. I conduct the 
Granger causality tests for both directions of the relation between fund flows and media 
coverage. I repeat the tests for three different lags of the two series. The results are 
presented in Table 25. Panel A presents results for the test of media coverage granger-
causing fund flows. The Wald test statistics for causality show that there is significant 
causality in Model 1, that is, recent media coverage granger-causes fund flows. Panel B 
tests for fund flows granger-causing media coverage, and fails to find evidence for 
causality. These results provide support for recent media coverage leading to fund flows, 
and confirm the underlying assumption of causality in the empirical analysis presented in 






While there is a substantial body of literature on various aspects of mutual funds, 
there has been little research on media coverage of mutual funds. A number of studies 
have examined the effects of news on non-financial firms from both a theoretical and 
empirical perspective.  However, there has not been a study that focuses on the attention 
and learning effects of media coverage for mutual funds.  This dissertation contributes 
towards filling this gap in the mutual fund literature.  
The principal focus of this dissertation is to investigate the pivotal role played by 
media coverage in the investment decisions of mutual fund investors. I study an 
underlying tenet of attention and learning models of mutual fund investors by examining 
sources of attention and learning, namely, news stories about funds.  I propose that media 
coverage of mutual funds can influence financial decisions by capturing the attention of 
investors and facilitating in their learning about mutual funds. Specifically, I test whether 
the attention and learning effects of media coverage on investors are manifested through 
changes in investment in the fund. An advantage of examining attention and learning 
effects through the use of net fund flows is that one can obtain a more direct effect of 
news coverage than is possible with other types of assets, which have confounding 




I find that media coverage of mutual funds has a significant effect on investor 
flows to the fund.  Mutual funds with a news article in a month earn additional 1.2% net 
flows, on average.  Further, it is evident that the media coverage affects investor learning 
in that media coverage does not have a uniform effect.  Having positive media coverage 
in a month is associated with a positive 1.5% boost in fund flows, while having negative 
media coverage results in a negative 1% impact on fund flows.  The significance of these 
numbers is further highlighted by the consideration that the average monthly fund flow 
for my sample is 1.08%. These results provide further evidence that media coverage can 
have significant economic effects on mutual funds. These results are also consistent with 
the hypothesis that investors learn about funds through media coverage and that this 
knowledge affects their investment behavior.       
The database for media coverage of mutual funds comprising of nearly 10,000 
news articles was constructed especially for this study. I examine the determinants of 
media coverage using several univariate and multivariate analyses.  The results show that 
fund characteristics affect the likelihood of media coverage.  Larger funds, those with 
extreme (high or low) performance, and those with more volatile returns are more likely 
to have news stories in general.  Larger funds also have more positive news articles than 
smaller funds. I also find that fund size and past performance influence the impact of 
media coverage on mutual fund flows. Media coverage seems to play a more significant 
role for smaller and lesser known funds, and the fund’s return performance enhances the 
impact of positive media coverage. 
I find a differential in flows based on fund age in the effects of a news story, 




additional news about the fund, there are smaller effects from the news. Older funds do 
not receive as high fund flows as do younger funds, even controlling for the differences 
in sizes between the funds. I also construct a test to differentiate between the attention 
and learning effects of media coverage on mutual fund flows. I examine the flows into 
funds that were listed in a ranking article against funds with almost identical returns that 
were not listed in the ranking article.  I find significant differences in flows between the 
two sets of funds, suggesting that just getting into a ranking article can provide 
significant attention effects for a fund. 
I employ the Heckman model of self-selection to conduct the empirical analyses. 
Selection bias may occur when funds that receive media coverage have a greater 
propensity to receive higher inflows. I control for this potential endogeneity by using the 
Heckman selection model. I conduct an additional robustness check on the results using 
alternate specification of the regression model. I employ the Sirri and Tufano (1998) 
piecewise linear specification for return performance. I find that the economic and 
statistic significance of the news variables are robust for different model specifications. 
Future research can include a comparative study of growth versus value funds. 
My dissertation performs an in-depth study of growth funds. An interesting parallel 
would be to examine investor reaction to value funds and compare the role of media 
coverage for value funds. There are many studies on value stocks earning higher returns 
than expensive glamour (growth) stocks. Lakonishok, et al. (1994) propose that the 
difference in the returns of value versus glamour stocks stems from investors’ judgmental 
biases. It may be hence be interesting to examine the attention and learning effects of 




for future research would be to examine investor perception of the fund manager and the 




Table 1. Fund Descriptive Statistics 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This table provides 
descriptive statistics on the mutual funds with growth objective included in the sample.  The 286 funds 
have a total of 406 share classes from the CRSP mutual fund database. The data for each of the share 
classes is combined by taking the value-weighted average across each share class connected to the fund.  
Total net assets is the total assets under management for the fund across all share classes.  The flow is the 
total net flow to the fund over the month calculated as a percentage of the fund’s assets.  The return is the 
monthly total return per share for each fund.  The expense ratio is the total operating expenses of the fund 
(including 12b-1 fees but excluding any load fees) calculated as a percentage of assets under management.  
The load fee is the total of all maximum front, deferred and rear-end load charges calculated as a 
percentage of assets under management. The fund age is calculated from the year the fund was organized. 
The mean, standard deviation, 10th percentile, median and 90th percentile are provided for each variable. 
Panel A provides the fund descriptive statistics for the total sample. Panel B provides the same statistics for 
observations of funds with media coverage and observations of funds without media coverage. t-statistics 
are provided for the differences in the means of the fund characteristics for the sub samples with and 
without media coverage. 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev 10th Pctl Median 90th Pctl
Panel A. Total Sample 
Total Net Assets (in millions) $1,692.00 $5,838.10 $22.12 $244.50  $3,320.50 
Flow (monthly net percentage) 1.08% 18.40% -2.71% 0.05% 4.34% 
Total Return (monthly) 1.26% 4.80% -4.14% 1.60% 6.42% 
Expense Ratio 1.27% 1.71% 0.46% 1.08% 1.76% 
Total Load 2.09% 2.47% 0.00% 3.91% 5.50% 
Fund Age 15.52 16.13 3.00 9.00 41.00 
Panel B. Sample divided by existence of media coverage 
Total Net Assets (in millions)      
Existence of media coverage  $4,460.76 $10,820.50 $21.80 $686.07  $11,427.01 
Absence of media coverage  $1,030.65 $3,458.45 $22.16 $205.18  $1,985.25 
t-statistic for the difference in means  21.29***     
Flow (monthly net percentage)      
Existence of media coverage  1.73% 13.16% -2.66% 0.29% 5.79% 
Absence of media coverage  0.92% 19.44% -2.72% 0.00% 4.07% 




Total Return (monthly)      
Existence of media coverage  1.19% 5.53% -4.49% 1.57% 6.67% 
Absence of media coverage  1.27% 4.60% -4.08% 1.62% 6.38% 
t-statistic for the difference in means -0.91     
Expense Ratio (%)      
Existence of media coverage  1.53% 2.52% 0.40% 1.00% 2.08% 
Absence of media coverage  1.20% 1.45% 0.48% 1.09% 1.72% 
t-statistic for the difference in means 8.57***     
Total Load (%)      
Existence of media coverage  1.60% 2.47% 0.00% 0.00% 5.73% 
Absence of media coverage  2.21% 2.45% 0.00% 0.46% 5.50% 
t-statistic for the difference in means -15.11***     
Fund Age (in years)      
Existence of media coverage  22.54 19.67 4.00 14.00 58.00 
Absence of media coverage  13.85 14.68 3.00 8.25 36.00 
t-statistic for the difference in means 28.21***     
 




Table 2. Circulation Data for Publications 
This table provides circulation data for the 12 daily, weekly and monthly publications included in the study. 
The news data was constructed by searching for news stories in these 12 publications about the 286 funds 
in the sample, through the Dow Jones Retrieval Service (now called Factiva) for the 1994-2000 sample 
period. The circulations for newspapers are provided in Panel A (Source: Audit Bureau of Circulations). 
These include the highest circulation newspapers with the largest number of stories about mutual funds 
available from Factiva. The ranks in Panel A are based on circulations of all newspapers. The circulations 
for magazines are provided in Panel B (Source: Media Distribution Services). Each of these magazines had 
the largest number of stories about mutual funds in their category. The ranks in Panel B are based on 
circulations among magazines in the specified category. 
 
Publication Circulation (in ‘000) Category Rank 
Panel A. Newspapers 
USA Today 2,666  1 
Wall Street Journal 2,107  2 
New York Times 1,681  3 
Los Angeles Times 1,292  4 
Washington Post 1,008  5 
Boston Globe 708  12 
Panel B. Magazines 
US News & World Report 2,019 News 3 
Money 1,945 Personal Finance 1 
Barron's 300 Personal Finance 6 
Business Week 987 Business 2 
Forbes 921 Business 3 





Table 3. Frequency distribution of news articles 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This table provides 
descriptive information on the 9,984 news articles portraying the 286 funds included in the sample.  For the 
12 daily, weekly and monthly publications, Panel A shows the name of the publication, the frequency of 
news mentions in that publication, and the percentage contribution of each publication to the total news 
stories.  Panel B provides the frequency and percentage of articles by the posture of the article. Panel C 
shows frequency and percentage contribution of each type of news article. Appendix B describes the 
methodology of classification of the news articles. 
 
 Frequency %
Panel A.  Publication 
Daily Publications:   
Boston Globe 1,023 10.25% 
Los Angeles Times 203 2.03% 
New York Times 61 0.61% 
USA Today 1,427 14.29% 
Washington Post 366 3.67% 
Wall Street Journal 3,093 30.98% 
Daily subtotal  6,173 61.83% 
Weekly/Monthly Publications:   
Barron's 1,383 13.85% 
Business Week 776 7.77% 
Forbes 319 3.20% 
Fortune 251 2.51% 
Money 733 7.34% 
US News & World Report 349 3.50% 
Weekly/Monthly subtotal 3,811 38.17% 
Total News Articles 9,984 100.00% 
Panel B. Posture of news story 
Positive 2,774 27.78% 




Neutral  5,024 50.32% 
Neutral-Negative 307 3.08% 
Negative 981 9.83% 
Total News Articles 9,984 100.00% 
Panel C. Type of news story 
Feature 460 4.61% 
Interview 181 1.81% 
Ranking 297 2.97% 
Performance 472 4.73% 
Mention 3811 38.17% 
Tables 4763 47.71% 





Table 4. Descriptive statistics of news articles 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This table shows 
descriptive statistics for the news data for the sample funds. Panel A provides the descriptive information 
for the existence of a news article for a fund in a month. The existence of a particular category of media 
coverage is denoted by the relevant dummy variable. The news dummy variable takes on value of one if 
there existed at least one news article in that category in a given month; else the dummy takes on value of 
zero. Panel B shows the descriptive statistics for the actual number of news articles in each category of 
classification for a fund in a month. 
 
  Mean Std Dev Maximum Median 
Panel A. Existence of news article in a month 
Dummy for whether fund had:      
  Any news article  0.19 0.40 1 0 
  Positive news article  0.10 0.30 1 0 
  Neutral news article  0.11 0.31 1 0 
  Negative news article  0.04 0.19 1 0 
Panel B. Frequency of news article in a month  
Number of articles  0.42 1.31 24 0 
Number of positive articles  0.15 0.60 12 0 
Number of neutral articles  0.21 0.90 22 0 





Table 5. Correlation Matrix 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This table shows the 
correlation between the variables used in the various analyses. Detailed definitions of all fund and news 
variables are provided in Chapter 4. 
 



















Market Flow 1.000 0.093 -0.091 0.020 -0.100 -0.407 -0.023 -0.021 
Monthly Fund Flow 0.093 1.000 -0.010 0.021 0.053 -0.031 -0.008 -0.005 
Total Net Assets -0.091 -0.010 1.000 0.004 0.036 0.030 -0.099 0.025 
Monthly Fund Return 0.020 0.021 0.004 1.000 0.306 -0.050 -0.044 0.000 
Annual Fund Return -0.100 0.053 0.036 0.306 1.000 0.076 -0.071 0.010 
Return Volatility -0.407 -0.031 0.030 -0.050 0.076 1.000 0.275 0.057 
Expense Ratio -0.023 -0.008 -0.099 -0.044 -0.071 0.275 1.000 0.073 
Load Fees -0.021 -0.005 0.025 0.000 0.010 0.057 0.073 1.000 
Fund Age -0.073 -0.052 0.214 -0.015 -0.032 0.062 0.103 0.065 
# news articles 0.002 0.016 0.418 -0.001 0.054 0.079 0.049 -0.102 
Cumulative # news articles -0.159 -0.016 0.594 -0.018 0.014 0.225 0.131 -0.116 
# positive news articles 0.019 0.028 0.231 0.012 0.148 0.048 -0.012 -0.104 
# neutral news articles -0.009 0.010 0.436 0.002 0.030 0.030 -0.014 -0.075 
# negative news articles -0.001 -0.016 0.048 -0.030 -0.138 0.149 0.257 -0.011 
Dummy for existence of 
any news 0.016 0.018 0.232 -0.007 0.031 0.065 0.076 -0.096 
Dummy for existence of 
positive news 0.011 0.029 0.192 0.007 0.124 0.039 -0.006 -0.102 
Dummy for existence of 
neutral news 0.006 0.011 0.292 0.002 0.028 0.035 0.009 -0.072 
Dummy for existence of 
negative news 0.002 -0.018 0.043 -0.040 -0.125 0.119 0.193 -0.028 
Performance news articles 0.008 0.005 0.220 0.003 0.037 0.015 0.008 -0.060 
Ranking news articles -0.003 0.011 0.120 0.008 0.114 0.067 -0.004 -0.047 
Mentions news articles -0.018 0.013 0.406 0.002 0.046 0.038 -0.018 -0.107 
Tables news articles 0.019 0.012 0.278 -0.004 0.021 0.084 0.096 -0.051 
Feature news articles -0.005 0.004 0.152 -0.013 0.027 0.037 0.036 -0.054 





Table 5. Correlation Matrix – continued. 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This table shows the 
correlations between the variables of media coverage and fund characteristics used in the various analyses. 
Detailed definitions of all fund and news variables are provided in Chapter 4. 
 





























Market Flow -0.073 0.002 -0.159 0.019 -0.009 -0.001 0.016 0.011 
Monthly Fund Flow -0.052 0.016 -0.016 0.028 0.010 -0.016 0.018 0.029 
Total Net Assets 0.214 0.418 0.594 0.231 0.436 0.048 0.232 0.192 
Monthly Fund Return -0.015 -0.001 -0.018 0.012 0.002 -0.030 -0.007 0.007 
Annual Fund Return -0.032 0.054 0.014 0.148 0.030 -0.138 0.031 0.124 
Return Volatility 0.062 0.079 0.225 0.048 0.030 0.149 0.065 0.039 
Expense Ratio 0.103 0.049 0.131 -0.012 -0.014 0.257 0.076 -0.006 
Load Fees 0.065 -0.102 -0.116 -0.104 -0.075 -0.011 -0.096 -0.102 
Fund Age 1.000 0.162 0.239 0.130 0.115 0.096 0.212 0.147 
# news articles 0.162 1.000 0.612 0.703 0.861 0.344 0.653 0.548 
Cumulative # news articles 0.239 0.612 1.000 0.337 0.582 0.229 0.398 0.288 
# positive news articles 0.130 0.703 0.337 1.000 0.329 0.080 0.525 0.786 
# neutral news articles 0.115 0.861 0.582 0.329 1.000 0.087 0.477 0.245 
# negative news articles 0.096 0.344 0.229 0.080 0.087 1.000 0.339 0.078 
Dummy for existence of 
any news 0.212 0.653 0.398 0.525 0.477 0.339 1.000 0.668 
Dummy for existence of 
positive news 0.147 0.548 0.288 0.786 0.245 0.078 0.668 1.000 
Dummy for existence of 
neutral news 0.170 0.619 0.423 0.278 0.679 0.095 0.702 0.249 
Dummy for existence of 
negative news 0.106 0.307 0.216 0.076 0.097 0.828 0.410 0.076 
Performance news articles 0.045 0.440 0.240 0.288 0.376 0.201 0.218 0.235 
Ranking news articles 0.017 0.276 0.132 0.411 0.111 0.050 0.200 0.292 
Mentions news articles 0.140 0.801 0.525 0.589 0.692 0.222 0.506 0.440 
Tables news articles 0.132 0.822 0.488 0.506 0.740 0.325 0.564 0.412 
Feature news articles 0.072 0.396 0.235 0.348 0.286 0.160 0.235 0.266 




Table 5. Correlation Matrix – continued. 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This table shows the 
correlation between the variables used in the various analyses. Detailed definitions of all fund and news 


































Market Flow 0.006 0.002 0.008 -0.003 -0.018 0.019 -0.005 0.001 
Monthly Fund Flow 0.011 -0.018 0.005 0.011 0.013 0.012 0.004 0.010 
Total Net Assets 0.292 0.043 0.220 0.120 0.406 0.278 0.152 0.040 
Monthly Fund Return 0.002 -0.040 0.003 0.008 0.002 -0.004 -0.013 0.004 
Annual Fund Return 0.028 -0.125 0.037 0.114 0.046 0.021 0.027 0.000 
Return Volatility 0.035 0.119 0.015 0.067 0.038 0.084 0.037 0.017 
Expense Ratio 0.009 0.193 0.008 -0.004 -0.018 0.096 0.036 -0.007 
Load Fees -0.072 -0.028 -0.060 -0.047 -0.107 -0.051 -0.054 -0.020 
Fund Age 0.170 0.106 0.045 0.017 0.140 0.132 0.072 0.048 
# news articles 0.619 0.307 0.440 0.276 0.801 0.822 0.396 0.176 
Cumulative # news articles 0.423 0.216 0.240 0.132 0.525 0.488 0.235 0.098 
# positive news articles 0.278 0.076 0.288 0.411 0.589 0.506 0.348 0.130 
# neutral news articles 0.679 0.097 0.376 0.111 0.692 0.740 0.286 0.158 
# negative news articles 0.095 0.828 0.201 0.050 0.222 0.325 0.160 0.031 
Dummy for existence of 
any news 0.702 0.410 0.218 0.200 0.506 0.564 0.235 0.168 
Dummy for existence of 
positive news 0.249 0.076 0.235 0.292 0.440 0.412 0.266 0.114 
Dummy for existence of 
neutral news 1.000 0.112 0.139 0.109 0.552 0.501 0.204 0.202 
Dummy for existence of 
negative news 0.112 1.000 0.164 0.040 0.211 0.282 0.138 0.042 
Performance news articles 0.139 0.164 1.000 0.124 0.255 0.255 0.164 -0.004 
Ranking news articles 0.109 0.040 0.124 1.000 0.160 0.133 0.054 0.038 
Mentions news articles 0.552 0.211 0.255 0.160 1.000 0.391 0.262 0.116 
Tables news articles 0.501 0.282 0.255 0.133 0.391 1.000 0.190 0.063 
Feature news articles 0.204 0.138 0.164 0.054 0.262 0.190 1.000 0.080 





Table 6. Media Coverage and Fund Characteristics - Univariate 
Analysis 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This table provides the 
results of univariate analyses of media coverage for fund characteristics. For each panel, the funds in the 
sample are divided into quintiles after sorting based on the relevant fund characteristic. For each quintile, 
the average number of news articles per month is calculated. The first column provides the average 
number of news articles for overall media coverage. The other three columns provide the averages for 
positive, neutral or negative news articles based on the posture of the news article towards the fund 
portrayed. Panel A focuses on Size, measured as Total Net Assets. Panel B focuses on Performance, 
measured as Return previous year. Panel C focuses on the volatility of the fund return for the previous 
year. 
 







Panel A. Average number of news articles by fund size 
Size Quintile 
     
Largest  1.12 0.41 0.64 0.06 
4  0.31 0.13 0.15 0.03 
3  0.20 0.09 0.08 0.03 
2  0.22 0.07 0.12 0.03 
Smallest  0.26 0.07 0.07 0.12 
Panel B. Average number of news articles by fund performance 
Performance Quintile 
     
Highest  0.59 0.26 0.29 0.04 
4  0.38 0.16 0.20 0.02 
3  0.37 0.15 0.19 0.03 
2  0.37 0.14 0.18 0.05 
Lowest  0.39 0.07 0.20 0.13 
Panel C. Average number of news articles by return volatility 
Volatility Quintile 
     
Highest  0.60 0.20 0.27 0.12 
4  0.35 0.12 0.18 0.05 
3  0.43 0.14 0.25 0.04 
2  0.35 0.15 0.18 0.03 




Table 7. Fund Performance and Posture of Media Coverage 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This table showcases a 
study of the influence of fund performance on the posture of media coverage. The study highlights the 
differences in proportions of news stories with positive/negative bias following positive/negative fund 
performance. The sample is divided into positive and negative bins based on whether the past fund returns 
were positive or negative. Then for each bin, the proportions of positive and negative news stories are 
obtained. This process is repeated for two different horizons of past return: previous month and previous 
year. Panel A provides results of this analysis for the total sample. Panel B considers the smaller half of the 
sample, obtained by restricting the fund total net assets (TNA) to below the sample median. Thus the 
results in Panel B will help isolate the sensitivity of the posture of media coverage to past performance of 
smaller funds.  
 
Panel A: Total Sample 
# total news stories # positive news stories # negative news stories 
9984 3672 1288 
   
 Proportion of Positive News 
Proportion of 
Negative News 
Return Previous Month:   
Positive Bin 0.40 0.10 
Negative Bin 0.32 0.17 
   
Return Previous Year:   
Positive Bin 0.41 0.09 
Negative Bin 0.11 0.40 
Panel B: Smaller Half of Sample 
# total news stories # positive news stories # negative news stories 
2806 937 798 
   
 Proportion of Positive News 
Proportion of 
Negative News 
Return Previous Month:   
Positive Bin 0.40 0.22 
Negative Bin 0.23 0.38 
   
Return Previous Year:   
Positive Bin 0.42 0.20 




Table 8. Media Coverage and Fund Characteristics – Multivariate 
Analysis 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This table provides the 
results of regressions using binary probit model in which the response variable is the flag for the existence 
of media coverage in a month, with two response levels of 1 and 0. The probability modeled is the 
existence of media coverage denoted by the response level of 1. Panel A presents the results from the 
regression for modeling the probability of any media coverage. Panel B presents the results from the 
regression run separately for modeling the probability of positive media coverage.  Panel C presents the 
results from the regression run separately for modeling the probability of negative media coverage. The 
independent variables include the natural logarithm of the previous month’s total net assets under 
management (TNA), the return on the fund for the previous month, the return on the fund for the previous 
year, the volatility of the fund return for the previous year, and the interaction term between the return for 
previous year and a dummy variable for small funds. The small dummy variable takes on a value of one if 
the fund’s TNA is smaller than the TNA of the median fund in the sample, and takes on a value of zero if 
the fund’s TNA exceeds the median fund’s TNA. p-values are provided in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates. 
 





Intercept -1.796 -2.703 -1.628 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log TNA previous month 0.127 0.183 -0.060 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return previous month 0.549 0.304 0.324 
 (0.008) (0.233) (0.282) 
Return previous year 0.173 0.834 -0.960 
 (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return volatility 4.729 2.443 8.872 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Small dummy * 
      Return previous year  -0.4425 0.488 -1.003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Likelihood Ratio  1,052.33 1,131.54 628.40 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Score                  1,095.14 1,142.92 919.38 




 Wald    962.85 951.12 572.78 




Table 9. Relation of Absolute Fund Flows to Media Coverage 
 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This table provides 
results from the Heckman maximum likelihood model for the absolute value of percentage net monthly 
flow into the fund as the dependent variable. The independent variables are the aggregate flows to the 
market for all funds in the sample during the period, the lagged flow to the fund for the previous period, 
the return to the fund for the previous year, log of the fund’s total net assets under management (TNA) 
for the previous period, the fund’s age in years, the fund’s expense ratio for the previous year, and the 
volatility of fund return for the previous year.  
The media coverage variable included in Model 1 is the actual number of news stories portraying the 
fund each month. The media coverage variable included in Model 2 is the actual number of news stories 
portraying the fund each month, weighted by the proportion of the circulation of each periodical to the 




 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -0.020 -0.016 
 (0.908) (0.927) 
Market Flow 0.083 0.073 
 (0.275) (0.342) 
Flow (t-1) 0.116 0.116 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Return previous year  0.024  0.024 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Log TNA (t-1) -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.664) (0.656) 
Age -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Expense ratio (t-1) -0.313 -0.304 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility of return previous year -0.215 -0.200 
 (0.289) (0.324) 
Number of news articles 0.002  




Circulation-weighted number of news articles  0.029 
  (0.000) 
Sigma 0.087 0.086 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Rho 0.388 0.372 
 (0.513) (0.539) 
Log likelihood  -5921 -5919 




Table 10. Relation of Directional Fund Flows to Posture of Media 
Coverage 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This table provides 
results from the Heckman maximum likelihood model for the percentage net monthly flow into the fund 
as the dependent variable. The independent variables are the aggregate flows to the market for all funds 
in the sample during the period, the lagged flow to the fund for the previous period, the return to the fund 
for the previous year, log of the fund’s total net assets under management (TNA) for the previous period, 
the fund’s age in years, the fund’s expense ratio for the previous year, and the volatility of fund return for 
the previous year. The media coverage variables included in Model 1 are the dummy variables for the 
existence of news stories in each period, classified by the posture of the article towards the fund 
portrayed. The media coverage variables included in Model 2 are the numbers of news stories in each 
period, classified by the posture of the article towards the fund portrayed. p-values are provided in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -0.210 -0.213 
 (0.290) (0.286) 
Market Flow 0.418 0.403 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Flow (t-1) 0.006 0.007 
 (0.694) (0.626) 
Return previous year 0.080 0.079 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Log TNA (t-1)  0.005  0.005 
 (0.513) (0.497) 
Age -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Expense ratio (t-1) -0.099 -0.096 
 (0.151) (0.168) 
Volatility of return previous year  0.226  0.225 
 (0.340) (0.345) 
Dummy for whether the fund has:   
Positive media coverage 0.015  




Neutral media coverage 0.007  
 (0.051)  
Negative media coverage -0.010  
 (0.009)  
Number of positive news articles  0.006 
  (0.000) 
Number of neutral news articles  0.002 
  (0.043) 
Number of negative news articles  -0.006 
  (0.005) 
Sigma 0.119 0.121 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Rho 0.689 0.702 
 (0.028) (0.019) 
Log likelihood  -6260 -6262 





Table 11. Relation of Directional Fund Flows to Interaction of Media 
Coverage and Fund Size 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This table provides 
results from the Heckman maximum likelihood model for the percentage net monthly flow into the fund 
as the dependent variable. The independent variables are the aggregate flows to the market for all funds 
in the sample during the period, the lagged flow to the fund for the previous period, the return to the fund 
for the previous year, log of the fund’s total net assets under management (TNA) for the previous period, 
the fund’s age in years, the fund’s expense ratio for the previous year, and the volatility of fund return for 
the previous year.  
The media coverage variables included in Model 1 are the actual number of news stories portraying the 
fund each month, and the interaction terms between the log of the fund’s TNA for the previous period 
and the number of news articles in the current period. The media coverage variables included in Model 2 
are the numbers of news stories in each period, classified by the posture of the article towards the fund 
portrayed, and the interaction terms between these news count variables and the log of the fund’s TNA 
for the previous period. p-values are provided in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -0.185 -0.215 
 (0.337) (0.272) 
Market Flow 0.418 0.373 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Flow (t-1) 0.007 -0.001 
 (0.613) (0.927) 
Return previous year 0.091 0.075 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Log TNA (t-1)  0.006  0.008 
 (0.389) (0.302) 
Age -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Expense ratio (t-1) -0.190 -0.100 
 (0.007) (0.167) 
Volatility of return previous year  0.121  0.167 
 (0.596) (0.473) 
Number of news articles  0.014  




Log TNA (t-1) * Number of news articles -0.001  
 (0.000)  
Number of positive news articles   0.031 
  (0.000) 
Number of neutral news articles   0.013 
  (0.000) 
Number of negative news articles   0.003 
  (0.457) 
 -0.003 Log TNA (t-1) * 
 Number of positive news articles  (0.000) 
  -0.001 Log TNA (t-1) * 
 Number of neutral news articles  (0.000) 
 -0.001 Log TNA (t-1) * 
 Number of negative news articles  (0.112) 
Sigma 0.109 0.115 
 (0.009) (0.013) 
Rho 0.611 0.665 
 (0.121) (0.049) 
Log likelihood  -6260 -6237 




Table 12. Relation of Directional Fund Flows to Interaction of Media 
Coverage and Fund Performance  
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This table provides 
results from the Heckman maximum likelihood model for the percentage net monthly flow into the fund 
as the dependent variable. The independent variables are the aggregate flows to the market for all funds 
in the sample during the period, the lagged flow to the fund for the previous period, the return to the fund 
for the previous year, log of the fund’s total net assets under management (TNA) for the previous period, 
the fund’s age in years, the fund’s expense ratio for the previous year, and the volatility of fund return for 
the previous year.  
The media coverage variables included in Model 1 are the actual number of news stories portraying the 
fund each month, and the interaction terms between the return to the fund for the previous year and the 
number of news articles in the current period. The media coverage variables included in Model 2 are the 
numbers of news stories in each period, classified by the posture of the article towards the fund 
portrayed, and the interaction terms between these news count variables and the return to the fund for the 
previous year.  p-values are provided in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -0.218 -0.223 
 (0.276) (0.264) 
Market Flow 0.441 0.440 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Flow (t-1) 0.012 0.001 
 (0.407) (0.979) 
Return previous year 0.105 0.105 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Log TNA (t-1)  0.005  0.006 
 (0.473) (0.457) 
Age -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Expense ratio (t-1) -0.156 -0.121 
 (0.025) (0.083) 
Volatility of return previous year  0.212  0.214 
 (0.374) (0.371) 
Number of news articles  0.004  




Return previous year * Number of news articles -0.005  
 (0.022)  
Number of positive news articles   0.002 
  (0.221) 
Number of neutral news articles   0.006 
  (0.000) 
Number of negative news articles  -0.004 
  (0.055) 
  0.013 Return previous year * 
 Number of positive news articles  (0.002) 
  -0.020 Return previous year * 
 Number of neutral news articles  (0.000) 
 -0.034 Return previous year * 
 Number of negative news articles  (0.000) 
Sigma 0.120 0.121 
 (0.015) (0.016) 
Rho 0.697 0.708 
 (0.022) (0.015) 
Log likelihood  -6272 -6232 




Table 13. Relation of Directional Fund Flows to Media Coverage 
considering Age of Fund 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This table provides 
results from the Heckman maximum likelihood model for the percentage net monthly flow into the fund 
as the dependent variable. The independent variables are the aggregate flows to the market for all funds 
in the sample during the period, the lagged flow to the fund for the previous period, the return to the fund 
for the previous year, log of the fund’s total net assets under management (TNA) for the previous period, 
the fund’s age in years, the fund’s expense ratio for the previous year, and the volatility of fund return for 
the previous year. The media coverage variables included in Model 1 are the number of news articles 
about the fund in the period, and the cumulative number of news articles about the fund beginning in 
1994 till the current period, along with the interaction terms between the age variable and the number of 
news articles and between the age variable and the cumulative number of news articles.  The media 
coverage variables included in Model 2 are the number of news articles about the fund in the period, and 
the cumulative number of news articles about the fund beginning in 1994 till the current period, along 
with the interaction terms between the age group dummy variables and the number of news articles and 
between the age group dummy variables and the cumulative number of news articles. p-values are 
provided in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -0.200 -0.156 
 (0.315) (0.399) 
Market Flow 0.270 0.267 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
Flow (t-1) 0.005 -0.008 
 (0.706) (0.593) 
Return previous year 0.088 0.083 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Log TNA (t-1)  0.006  0.004 
 (0.459) (0.542) 
Age -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.017) (0.062) 
Expense ratio (t-1) -0.145 -0.148 
 (0.037) (0.032) 
Volatility of return previous year  0.255  0.110 




Number of news articles 0.005  0.002 
 (0.000) (0.127) 
Cumulative number of news articles -0.035 -0.022 
 (0.000) (0.005) 
Age * Number of news articles -0.001  
 (0.002)  
Age *  Cumulative number of news articles 0.001  
 (0.012)  
Young funds * Number of news articles  0.012 
  (0.000) 
Young funds * Cumulative number of news articles  -0.011 
  (0.205) 
Old funds * Number of news articles  -0.001 
  (0.336) 
Old funds * Cumulative number of news articles  0.005 
  (0.495) 
Sigma 0.119 0.107 
 (0.015) (0.006) 
Rho 0.690 0.598 
 (0.027) (0.128) 
Log likelihood  -6259 -6195 





Table 14. The Impact of Ranking Articles on Fund Flows 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This table showcases the 
differences in flows between two sets of matched funds with similar returns, only one of which has been 
portrayed in a Ranking article. Each fund included in a ranking article is paired with the fund closest to it 
in terms of return, the difference in the two returns being no more than 0.005. The table shows the 
summary statistics for each set of the matched funds. The t-test statistics are provided for the differences 
in flows and differences in returns between the two funds in each pair. 
 
  













Mean  3.41 % 0.27 % 15.15 % 15.01 % 
Standard Deviation  9.79 % 5.04 % 17.78 % 17.77 % 
      
t-statistic for   
the difference  3.61*** 0.07 
      
 





Table 15. Relation of Fund Flows to Media Coverage employing the 
Piecewise Linear Specification 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This table provides 
results from alternate specification of the regression model to check for robustness of the regression 
results. The piecewise linear specification for the fund flow-performance relation proposed by Sirri and 
Tufano (1998) is employed. The independent variables include log of the fund’s total net assets under 
management (TNA) for the previous period, the aggregate flows for all funds in the same investment 
category, the volatility of the previous year’s monthly returns, the level of total fees (expense ratio plus 
amortized load) charged by the fund for an investor with a seven-year holding period, and measures of 
fractional performance rank of the fund in the previous year.  
A fund’s fractional RANK represents its percentile performance relative to other funds with the same 
investment objective in the same period, and ranges from 0 to 1. This table presents the results for the 
model with four kinks, where the coefficients on fractional ranks are estimated using a piecewise linear 
regression framework over five quintiles. The coefficients on these piecewise linear decompositions of 
fractional ranks represent the slope of the performance-flow relationship over their range of sensitivity. 
These regressions are run on cross-sectionally for each of the 84 months of the sample period, and the 
Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are calculated for the coefficients from the vector of monthly results, 
employing the Fama and Macbeth (1973) technique. The t-statistics are given in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates. The average adjusted R-squared values are also provided. 
The media coverage variable included in Model 1 is the dummy variable for the existence of any news 
article portraying the fund in each period. The media coverage variable included in Model 2 is the total 
number of news stories in each period potraying the fund. 
  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept  0.005  0.007 
 (0.64) (0.89) 
Log Lag TNA -0.004 -0.004 
 (-5.05)*** (-5.16)*** 
Flows to fund category 0.999 1.005 
 (3.87)*** (3.71)*** 
Std. Dev. of returns  -0.367  -0.372 
 (-3.74)*** (-3.70)*** 
Total fees 0.003 0.003 
 (1.36) (1.44) 
Breakdown of RANK:   




 (2.54)** (2.45)** 
4th performance quintile 0.046 0.043 
 (3.66)*** (3.92)*** 
3rd performance quintile 0.034 0.040 
 (2.41)** (3.20)*** 
2nd performance quintile 0.022 0.016 
 (1.60) (1.17) 
Top performance quintile 0.125 0.128 
 (3.60)*** (3.74)*** 
Dummy for whether the fund has: 0.012  
       Any media coverage (6.43)***  
Number of news articles  0.004 
  (5.81)*** 
Adj. R2 (%) 7.01 7.22 
 




Table 16. Relation of Fund Flows to Media Coverage employing the 
Piecewise Linear Specification considering Posture of Media 
Coverage  
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This table provides 
results from alternate specification of the regression model to check for robustness of the regression 
results. The piecewise linear specification for the fund flow-performance relation proposed by Sirri and 
Tufano (1998) is employed. The independent variables include log of the fund’s total net assets under 
management (TNA) for the previous period, the aggregate flows for all funds in the same investment 
category, the volatility of the previous year’s monthly returns, the level of total fees (expense ratio plus 
amortized load) charged by the fund for an investor with a seven-year holding period, and measures of 
fractional performance rank of the fund in the previous year. A fund’s fractional RANK represents its 
percentile performance relative to other funds with the same investment objective in the same period, and 
ranges from 0 to 1. This table presents the results for the model with four kinks, where the coefficients on 
fractional ranks are estimated using a piecewise linear regression framework over five quintiles. The 
coefficients on these piecewise linear decompositions of fractional ranks represent the slope of the 
performance-flow relationship over their range of sensitivity. These regressions are run on cross-
sectionally for each of the 84 months of the sample period, and the Newey-West (1987) t-statistics are 
calculated for the coefficients from the vector of monthly results, employing the Fama and Macbeth 
(1973) technique. The t-statistics are given in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The average 
adjusted R-squared values are also provided. The media coverage variables included in Model 1 are the 
dummy variables for the existence of news stories in each period, classified by the posture of the article 
towards the fund portrayed. The media coverage variables included in Model 2 are the numbers of news 
stories in each period, classified by the posture of the article towards the fund portrayed. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept  0.011  0.011 
 (1.47) (1.50) 
Log Lag TNA -0.004 -0.004 
 (-5.31)*** (-5.28)*** 
Flows to fund category 0.994 1.004 
 (3.73)*** (3.66)*** 
Std. Dev. of returns  -0.358  -0.350 
 (-3.75)*** (-3.72)*** 
Total fees 0.004 0.004 
 (1.97)** (1.84)* 
Breakdown of RANK:   
Bottom performance quintile 0.028 0.025 




4th performance quintile 0.036 0.039 
 (3.18)*** (3.66)*** 
3rd performance quintile 0.039 0.039 
 (3.09)*** (3.29)*** 
2nd performance quintile 0.020 0.018 
 (1.53) (1.37) 
Top performance quintile 0.122 0.121 
 (3.56)*** (3.57)*** 
Dummy for whether the fund has:   
Positive media coverage 0.018  
 (4.35)***  
Neutral media coverage 0.012  
 (4.20)***  
Negative media coverage -0.013  
 (-3.61)***  
Number of positive news articles  0.009 
  (5.58)*** 
Number of neutral news articles  0.005 
  (2.92)*** 
Number of negative news articles  -0.011 
  (-3.33)*** 
Adj. R2 (%) 7.61 7.88 
 





Table 17. Relation of Directional Fund Flows to Posture of Media 
Coverage for Index Funds 
The sample includes index funds with a growth objective that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. 
This table provides results from the Heckman maximum likelihood model for the percentage net monthly 
flow into the fund as the dependent variable. The independent variables are the aggregate flows to the 
market for all funds in the sample during the period, the lagged flow to the fund for the previous period, 
the return to the fund for the previous year, log of the fund’s total net assets under management (TNA) 
for the previous period, the fund’s age in years, the fund’s expense ratio for the previous year, and the 
volatility of fund return for the previous year.  
The media coverage variables included in Model 1 are the dummy variables for the existence of news 
stories in each period, classified by the posture of the article towards the fund portrayed. The media 
coverage variables included in Model 2 are the numbers of news stories in each period, classified by the 
posture of the article towards the fund portrayed. p-values are provided in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept  0.227  0.072 
 (0.806) (0.932) 
Market Flow 0.361 0.355 
 (0.013) (0.015) 
Flow (t-1) 0.386 0.387 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Return previous year 0.042 0.028 
 (0.656) (0.752) 
Log TNA (t-1) -0.017 -0.006 
 (0.788) (0.915) 
Age  0.001  0.001 
 (0.507) (0.684) 
Expense ratio (t-1) -1.691 -1.357 
 (0.272) (0.381) 
Volatility of return previous year  0.552  0.010 
 (0.866) (0.997) 
Dummy for whether the fund has:   




 (0.121)  
Neutral media coverage -0.004  
 (0.517)  
Negative media coverage -0.006  
 (0.358)  
Number of positive news articles  0.005 
  (0.031) 
Number of neutral news articles  -0.001 
  (0.542) 
Number of negative news articles  -0.004 
  (0.309) 
Sigma 0.066 0.040 
 (0.760) (0.506) 
Rho -0.811 -0.247 
 (0.557) (0.966) 
Log likelihood   -132.69  -133.73 





Table 18. Relation of Directional Fund Flows to Interaction of Media 
Coverage and Fund Size for Index Funds 
The sample includes index funds with a growth objective that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. 
This table provides results from the Heckman maximum likelihood model for the percentage net monthly 
flow into the fund as the dependent variable. The independent variables are the aggregate flows to the 
market for all funds in the sample during the period, the lagged flow to the fund for the previous period, 
the return to the fund for the previous year, log of the fund’s total net assets under management (TNA) 
for the previous period, the fund’s age in years, the fund’s expense ratio for the previous year, and the 
volatility of fund return for the previous year.  
The media coverage variables included in Model 1 are the actual number of news stories portraying the 
fund each month, and the interaction terms between the log of the fund’s TNA for the previous period 
and the number of news articles in the current period. The media coverage variables included in Model 2 
are the numbers of news stories in each period, classified by the posture of the article towards the fund 
portrayed, and the interaction terms between these news count variables and the log of the fund’s TNA 
for the previous period. p-values are provided in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept  0.141  0.388 
 (0.871) (0.731) 
Market Flow 0.367 0.305 
 (0.013) (0.036) 
Flow (t-1) 0.407 0.379 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Return previous year 0.036 0.056 
 (0.687) (0.633) 
Log TNA (t-1) -0.011 -0.027 
 (0.861) (0.726) 
Age  0.001  0.001 
 (0.876) (0.833) 
Expense ratio (t-1) -1.257 -1.256 
 (0.407) (0.421) 
Volatility of return previous year  0.267  1.049 
 (0.931) (0.794) 
Number of news articles  0.001  




Log TNA (t-1) * Number of news articles  0.001  
 (0.960)  
Number of positive news articles   0.026 
  (0.016) 
Number of neutral news articles   -0.008 
  (0.289) 
Number of negative news articles  -0.018 
  (0.227) 
 -0.002 Log TNA (t-1) * 
 Number of positive news articles  (0.032) 
   0.001 Log TNA (t-1) * 
 Number of neutral news articles  (0.265) 
  0.002 Log TNA (t-1) * 
 Number of negative news articles  (0.297) 
Sigma 0.050 0.108 
 (0.751) (0.723) 
Rho -0.625 -0.935 
 (0.839) (0.013) 
Log likelihood  -136.85 -129.29 




Table 19. Relation of Directional Fund Flows to Interaction of Media 
Coverage and Fund Performance for Index Funds 
The sample includes index funds with a growth objective that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. 
This table provides results from the Heckman maximum likelihood model for the percentage net monthly 
flow into the fund as the dependent variable. The independent variables are the aggregate flows to the 
market for all funds in the sample during the period, the lagged flow to the fund for the previous period, 
the return to the fund for the previous year, log of the fund’s total net assets under management (TNA) 
for the previous period, the fund’s age in years, the fund’s expense ratio for the previous year, and the 
volatility of fund return for the previous year.  
The media coverage variables included in Model 1 are the actual number of news stories portraying the 
fund each month, and the interaction terms between the return to the fund for the previous year and the 
number of news articles in the current period. The media coverage variables included in Model 2 are the 
numbers of news stories in each period, classified by the posture of the article towards the fund 
portrayed, and the interaction terms between these news count variables and the return to the fund for the 
previous year.  p-values are provided in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept  0.150  0.047 
 (0.864) (0.955) 
Market Flow 0.368 0.353 
 (0.012) (0.016) 
Flow (t-1) 0.407 0.385 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Return previous year 0.038 0.029 
 (0.678) (0.743) 
Log TNA (t-1) -0.011 -0.005 
 (0.854) (0.937) 
Age  0.001  0.001 
 (0.878) (0.653) 
Expense ratio (t-1) -1.258 -1.467 
 (0.406) (0.355) 
Volatility of return previous year  0.296  -0.084 
 (0.925) (0.978) 
Number of news articles  0.001  




Return previous year * Number of news articles  0.001  
 (0.926)  
Number of positive news articles   0.008 
  (0.137) 
Number of neutral news articles   -0.001 
  (0.613) 
Number of negative news articles  -0.005 
  (0.606) 
 -0.014 Return previous year * 
 Number of positive news articles  (0.525) 
   0.002 Return previous year * 
 Number of neutral news articles  (0.731) 
  0.002 Return previous year * 
 Number of negative news articles  (0.972) 
Sigma 0.051 0.039 
 (0.756) (0.014) 
Rho -0.655 -0.065 
 (0.816) (0.992) 
Log likelihood  -136.84 -133.52 




Table 20. Relation of Directional Fund Flows to Media Coverage 
considering Age of Fund for Index Funds 
The sample includes index funds with a growth objective that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. 
This table provides results from the Heckman maximum likelihood model for the percentage net monthly 
flow into the fund as the dependent variable. The independent variables are the aggregate flows to the 
market for all funds in the sample during the period, the lagged flow to the fund for the previous period, 
the return to the fund for the previous year, log of the fund’s total net assets under management (TNA) 
for the previous period, the fund’s age in years, the fund’s expense ratio for the previous year, and the 
volatility of fund return for the previous year.  
The media coverage variables included in Model 1 are the number of news articles about the fund in the 
period, and the cumulative number of news articles about the fund beginning in 1994 till the current 
period, along with the interaction terms between the age variable and the number of news articles and 
between the age variable and the cumulative number of news articles.  The media coverage variables 
included in Model 2 are the number of news articles about the fund in the period, and the cumulative 
number of news articles about the fund beginning in 1994 till the current period, along with the 
interaction terms between the age group dummy variables and the number of news articles and between 
the age group dummy variables and the cumulative number of news articles. p-values are provided in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -0.020  0.249 
 (0.981) (0.793) 
Market Flow 0.400 0.341 
 (0.015) (0.038) 
Flow (t-1) 0.398  0.379 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Return previous year 0.030 0.042 
 (0.735) (0.667) 
Log TNA (t-1)  -0.002  -0.021 
 (0.970) (0.754) 
Age  0.001  0.001 
 (0.556) (0.293) 
Expense ratio (t-1) -0.927 -3.013 
 (0.550) (0.064) 
Volatility of return previous year  -0.092  0.616 




Number of news articles 0.008  0.019 
 (0.085) (0.001) 
Cumulative number of news articles -0.025 -0.008 
 (0.143) (0.557) 
Age * Number of news articles 0.001  
 (0.554)  
Age *  Cumulative number of news articles 0.002  
 (0.019)  
Young funds * Number of news articles  -0.015 
  (0.015) 
Young funds * Cumulative number of news articles   0.006 
  (0.707) 
Old funds * Number of news articles  -0.019 
  (0.001) 
Old funds * Cumulative number of news articles  0.023 
  (0.091) 
Sigma 0.039 0.069 
 (0.005) (0.762) 
Rho 0.057 -0.833 
 (0.993) (0.493) 
Log likelihood  -133.45 -128.65 





Table 21. Relation of Directional Fund Flows to Posture of Media 
Coverage for Non-Index Funds 
The sample includes non-index funds with a growth objective that existed over the 1994-2000 time 
period. This table provides results from the Heckman maximum likelihood model for the percentage net 
monthly flow into the fund as the dependent variable. The independent variables are the aggregate flows 
to the market for all funds in the sample during the period, the lagged flow to the fund for the previous 
period, the return to the fund for the previous year, log of the fund’s total net assets under management 
(TNA) for the previous period, the fund’s age in years, the fund’s expense ratio for the previous year, and 
the volatility of fund return for the previous year.   
The media coverage variables included in Model 1 are the dummy variables for the existence of news 
stories in each period, classified by the posture of the article towards the fund portrayed. The media 
coverage variables included in Model 2 are the numbers of news stories in each period, classified by the 
posture of the article towards the fund portrayed. p-values are provided in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -0.198 -0.192 
 (0.294) (0.308) 
Market Flow 0.425 0.407 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Flow (t-1) 0.002 0.003 
 (0.891) (0.833) 
Return previous year 0.081 0.081 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Log TNA (t-1)  0.004  0.004 
 (0.550) (0.564) 
Age  0.001  0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Expense ratio (t-1) -0.103 -0.102 
 (0.154) (0.162) 
Volatility of return previous year  0.279  0.260 
 (0.036) (0.341) 
Dummy for whether the fund has:   




 (0.000)  
Neutral media coverage 0.007  
 (0.052)  
Negative media coverage -0.011  
 (0.010)  
Number of positive news articles  0.006 
  (0.000) 
Number of neutral news articles  0.002 
  (0.014) 
Number of negative news articles  -0.006 
  (0.012) 
Sigma 0.118 0.118 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Rho 0.654 0.653 
 (0.044) (0.045) 
Log likelihood  -5800 -5800 





Table 22. Relation of Directional Fund Flows to Interaction of Media 
Coverage and Fund Size for Non-Index Funds 
The sample includes non-index funds with a growth objective that existed over the 1994-2000 time 
period. This table provides results from the Heckman maximum likelihood model for the percentage net 
monthly flow into the fund as the dependent variable. The independent variables are the aggregate flows 
to the market for all funds in the sample during the period, the lagged flow to the fund for the previous 
period, the return to the fund for the previous year, log of the fund’s total net assets under management 
(TNA) for the previous period, the fund’s age in years, the fund’s expense ratio for the previous year, and 
the volatility of fund return for the previous year.  
The media coverage variables included in Model 1 are the actual number of news stories portraying the 
fund each month, and the interaction terms between the log of the fund’s TNA for the previous period 
and the number of news articles in the current period. The media coverage variables included in Model 2 
are the numbers of news stories in each period, classified by the posture of the article towards the fund 
portrayed, and the interaction terms between these news count variables and the log of the fund’s TNA 
for the previous period. p-values are provided in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -0.174 -0.202 
 (0.340) (0.275) 
Market Flow 0.426 0.382 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Flow (t-1) 0.003 -0.005 
 (0.827) (0.727) 
Return previous year 0.093 0.077 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Log TNA (t-1)  0.006  0.007 
 (0.382) (0.293) 
Age  0.001  0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Expense ratio (t-1) -0.196 -0.104 
 (0.007) (0.166) 
Volatility of return previous year  0.155  0.213 
 (0.560) (0.427) 
Number of news articles  0.015  




Log TNA (t-1) * Number of news articles -0.001  
 (0.000)  
Number of positive news articles   0.031 
  (0.000) 
Number of neutral news articles   0.015 
  (0.000) 
Number of negative news articles   0.003 
  (0.361) 
 -0.003 Log TNA (t-1) * 
 Number of positive news articles  (0.000) 
  -0.001 Log TNA (t-1) * 
 Number of neutral news articles  (0.000) 
 -0.001 Log TNA (t-1) * 
 Number of negative news articles  (0.086) 
Sigma 0.109 0.113 
 (0.003) (0.006) 
Rho 0.570 0.622 
 (0.158) (0.080) 
Log likelihood  -5798 -5777 




Table 23. Relation of Directional Fund Flows to Interaction of Media 
Coverage and Fund Performance for Non-Index Funds 
The sample includes non-index funds with a growth objective that existed over the 1994-2000 time 
period. This table provides results from the Heckman maximum likelihood model for the percentage net 
monthly flow into the fund as the dependent variable. The independent variables are the aggregate flows 
to the market for all funds in the sample during the period, the lagged flow to the fund for the previous 
period, the return to the fund for the previous year, log of the fund’s total net assets under management 
(TNA) for the previous period, the fund’s age in years, the fund’s expense ratio for the previous year, and 
the volatility of fund return for the previous year.  
The media coverage variables included in Model 1 are the actual number of news stories portraying the 
fund each month, and the interaction terms between the return to the fund for the previous year and the 
number of news articles in the current period. The media coverage variables included in Model 2 are the 
numbers of news stories in each period, classified by the posture of the article towards the fund 
portrayed, and the interaction terms between these news count variables and the return to the fund for the 
previous year.  p-values are provided in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -0.200 -0.212 
 (0.291) (0.264) 
Market Flow 0.443 0.451 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Flow (t-1) 0.008 -0.003 
 (0.604) (0.827) 
Return previous year 0.107 0.108 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Log TNA (t-1)  0.005  0.005 
 (0.523) (0.478) 
Age  0.001  0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Expense ratio (t-1) -0.162 -0.122 
 (0.026) (0.091) 
Volatility of return previous year  0.243  0.272 
 (0.376) (0.323) 
Number of news articles  0.004  




Return previous year * Number of news articles -0.006  
 (0.030)  
Number of positive news articles   0.002 
  (0.256) 
Number of neutral news articles   0.007 
  (0.000) 
Number of negative news articles  -0.004 
  (0.064) 
  0.013 Return previous year * 
 Number of positive news articles  (0.002) 
  -0.022 Return previous year * 
 Number of neutral news articles  (0.000) 
 -0.035 Return previous year * 
 Number of negative news articles  (0.000) 
Sigma 0.118 0.120 
 (0.007) (0.008) 
Rho 0.652 0.676 
 (0.046) (0.026) 
Log likelihood  -5809 -5772 




Table 24. Relation of Directional Fund Flows to Media Coverage 
considering Age of Fund for Non-Index Funds 
The sample includes non-index funds with a growth objective that existed over the 1994-2000 time 
period. This table provides results from the Heckman maximum likelihood model for the percentage net 
monthly flow into the fund as the dependent variable. The independent variables are the aggregate flows 
to the market for all funds in the sample during the period, the lagged flow to the fund for the previous 
period, the return to the fund for the previous year, log of the fund’s total net assets under management 
(TNA) for the previous period, the fund’s age in years, the fund’s expense ratio for the previous year, and 
the volatility of fund return for the previous year.  
The media coverage variables included in Model 1 are the number of news articles about the fund in the 
period, and the cumulative number of news articles about the fund beginning in 1994 till the current 
period, along with the interaction terms between the age variable and the number of news articles and 
between the age variable and the cumulative number of news articles.  The media coverage variables 
included in Model 2 are the number of news articles about the fund in the period, and the cumulative 
number of news articles about the fund beginning in 1994 till the current period, along with the 
interaction terms between the age group dummy variables and the number of news articles and between 
the age group dummy variables and the cumulative number of news articles. p-values are provided in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -0.176 -0.133 
 (0.347) (0.449) 
Market Flow 0.260 0.260 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
Flow (t-1) 0.001 -0.013 
 (0.983) (0.391) 
Return previous year 0.090 0.084 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Log TNA (t-1)  0.005  0.003 
 (0.524) (0.621) 
Age  0.001  0.001 
 (0.026) (0.166) 
Expense ratio (t-1) -0.151 -0.154 
 (0.037) (0.032) 
Volatility of return previous year  0.281  0.123 




Number of news articles 0.006  0.002 
 (0.000) (0.110) 
Cumulative number of news articles -0.039 -0.026 
 (0.000) (0.002) 
Age * Number of news articles  0.001  
 (0.002)  
Age *  Cumulative number of news articles 0.001  
 (0.010)  
Young funds * Number of news articles  0.013 
  (0.000) 
Young funds * Cumulative number of news articles  -0.007 
  (0.493) 
Old funds * Number of news articles  -0.002 
  (0.267) 
Old funds * Cumulative number of news articles  0.007 
  (0.362) 
Sigma 0.116 0.105 
 (0.006) (0.002) 
Rho 0.637 0.535 
 (0.062) (0.204) 
Log likelihood  -5735 -5735 





Table 25. Granger Causality Test Results 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This table provides 
summary results for a vector autoregression (VAR) analysis of the relation between media coverage 
and fund flows. Fund flows are measured as percentage net monthly flow into the fund News is 
measured by the dummy variable for the existence of any news article portraying the fund in each 
period. This table provides summary results from three sets of Granger causality tests performed for 
each direction of causality. In addition to the zero-lag variable, Model 1 includes a single lag 
variable, Model 2 includes two lags of each variable and Model 3 includes three lags of each 
variable. Panel A presents the results for the regressions testing media coverage granger-causing 
mutual fund flows. Panel B presents the results for fund flows granger-causing media coverage of 
mutual funds. The table also provides the statistic for the Wald test for Granger causality for each 
regression. p-values are provided in parentheses  below coefficient estimates. 
 








Intercept 0.666 0.632 0.628 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Flow (t-1) 0.007 0.019 0.018 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) 
Flow (t-2)  0.039 0.039 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Flow (t-3)   0.023 
   (0.001) 
News (t) 0.330 0.542 0.583 
 (0.077) (0.117) (0.102) 
News (t-1) 0.330 0.207 0.241 
 (0.449) (0.552) (0.500) 
News (t-2)  0.089 0.131 
  (0.796) (0.713) 
News (t-3)   -0.189 




Wald test for Granger-Causality:    
Chi-Square 5.28 5.77 8.43 
 p-value (0.072) (0.449) (0.751) 








Intercept 0.104 0.074 0.056 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
News (t-1) 
0.462 0.328 0.259 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
News (t-2) 
 0.290 0.211 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
News (t-3) 
  0.238 
 
  (0.000) 
Flow (t) 
0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.084) (0.170) (0.197) 
Flow (t-1) 
0.007 0.006 0.005 
 
(0.479) (0.525) (0.611) 
Flow (t-2) 
 0.001 0.001 
 
 (0.796) (0.950) 
Flow (t-3) 
  0.001 
 
  (0.821) 
Wald test for Granger-Causality:    
Chi-Square 0.88 2.75 4.30 





Figure 1. Growth in Total Net Assets (in $ million) 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This figure shows the growth in the total net assets under 
management for the sample funds through the sample period. The graph plots the average total net assets of all the funds in the sample 














FIGURE 2. CHANGES IN PERCENTAGE FUND FLOWS 
 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This figure shows the changes in the percentage net 
flows into the funds through the sample period. The fund flow for each fund is calculated as Flowi,t={TNAi,t-(TNAi,t-1*(1+Ri,t))}/TNAi,t-1 
where TNA is the total net assets for each fund and R is the monthly total return for each fund. The graph plots the average percentage 


















Figure 3. Monthly Return 
 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This figure shows the changes in the monthly total return 
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Figure 4A. Probability of Media Coverage 
 
This figure shows the trend in the average probability of a fund receiving any media coverage through 
the sample period.  











Figure 4B. Seasonality in Media Coverage 
This figure shows the seasonality in the probability of a fund receiving any media coverage. The average 
probability of overall media coverage is calculated for the whole sample for each calendar month. 









Figure 5. Posture of Media Coverage 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. The figures below show 
the trend in the frequency of media coverage for funds in the sample through the sample period. The 
figures depict the trends for positive, neutral and negative media coverage. The average frequency for 
each posture of media coverage is calculated for the whole sample for each calendar month. 
 













































































Figure 6. Seasonality in Posture of Media Coverage 
The figures below show the seasonality in the frequency of media coverage for funds in the sample. 
Each figure focuses on a specific category of media coverage based on the posture of the news articles 
with regard to the fund portrayed. The average frequency of each category of media coverage is 
calculated for the whole sample for each calendar month. 
 



































































































Figure 7. Type of Media Coverage 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. The figures below show 
the trend in the frequency of media coverage for funds in the sample through the sample period. Each 
figure focuses on a specific type of media coverage as specified in the section on the classification of 
news articles. The average frequency of each type of media coverage is calculated for the whole sample 
for each calendar month. 










































































Figure 7. Type of Media Coverage – Continued 
 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. The figures below show 
the trend in the frequency of media coverage for funds in the sample through the sample period. Each 
figure focuses on a specific type of media coverage. The average frequency of each type of media 
coverage is calculated for the whole sample for each calendar month. 












































































Figure 8. Seasonality in Type of Media Coverage 
 
The figures below show the seasonality in the frequency of media coverage for funds in the sample. Each 
figure focuses on a specific type of media coverage. The average frequency of each type of media 
coverage is calculated for the whole sample for each calendar month. 
 



































































































Figure 8. Seasonality in Type of Media Coverage – Continued 
 
The figures below show the seasonality in the frequency of media coverage for funds in the sample. Each 
figure focuses on a specific type of media coverage. The average frequency of each type of media 
coverage is calculated for the whole sample for each calendar month. 
 






































































































Mutual Fund Share Classes 
This appendix provides a background on mutual fund share classes.30 Mutual 
funds are often classified according to the class of shares that fund sponsors offer to 
investors: primarily load or no-load classes. Load classes generally serve investors who 
hold funds through financial advisers; no-load fund classes usually serve investors who 
purchase funds without the assistance of a financial adviser or who choose to compensate 
the financial adviser separately. More than half of all mutual funds offer two or more 
share classes. Funds that sell through financial advisers offer more than one share class to 
provide investors with several ways to pay for the services of financial advisers. 
 
Load Share Classes 
Load share classes - typically labeled class A, B, and C shares - usually include a 
sales load and/or a 12b-1 fee. The sales load and 12b-1 fees are used to compensate 
financial advisers for their services. 
Class A shares  
Class A shares represent the traditional means of paying for investment advice 
and assistance. Class A shares generally charge a front-end sales load at the time of the 
purchase as a percentage of the sales price or offering price. This share class also often 
has a 12b-1 fee of about 0.25 percent. Class A shares are sometimes used in employer-
                                                 
30  Source: Investment Company Institute, 2006 
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sponsored retirement plans, and funds usually waive the front-end sales load for these 
investors. 
Class B shares 
Class B shares typically do not have a front-end sales load. Investors using B 
shares pay for financial advisers through a combination of an annual 12b-1 fee, usually 1 
percent, and a contingent deferred sales load (CDSL). The CDSL is triggered if fund 
shares are redeemed before a fixed number of years of ownership. The CDSL decreases 
the longer the investor owns the shares and reaches zero typically after shares have been 
held six or seven years. After six to eight years, B shares usually convert to A shares, 
which have a lower 12b-1 fee. 
Class C shares 
Class C shares generally do not have a front-end load. Investors in this share class 
compensate financial advisers with a combination of an annual 1 percent 12b-1 fee and a 
1 percent CDSL paid directly by shareholders if they sell their shares within the first year 
after purchase. This share class, unlike B shares, typically does not convert to A shares.   
 
NO-LOAD SHARE CLASSES 
No-load share classes have no front-end load or CDSL and have a 12b-1 fee of 
0.25 percent or less. Originally, no-load share classes were offered by mutual fund 
sponsors that sold directly to investors. Now, however, investors can purchase no-load 
funds through employer-sponsored retirement plans, mutual fund supermarkets, discount 
brokerage firms, and bank trust departments. Some financial advisers who charge 
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investors separately for their services rather than through a load or 12b-1 fee also use no-
load share classes.  
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Appendix B 
Classification of News Articles 
I trained and supervised a team of 6 research assistants to help in the collection 
and classification of part of the news database. I individually trained and monitored each 
member of the team for a significant period of time. After each member was fully trained, 
I assigned funds for which they were to search and classify news articles.  I picked a 
random sample of 20% of the articles classified by each of them and reclassified them to 
ensure total compliance with the training given.  
 
Methodology of Classification  
The goals were: 
• To search for mentions of each of the 286 sample funds in 12 major 
publications through the Dow Jones Retrieval Service (now called 
Factiva) for the 1994-2000 sample period. 
• To subsequently classify each of the 9,984 news articles in terms of a 
given set of characteristics.  
The search criteria were as follows for each of the 286 funds: 
• The following list of publications was selected:  
Boston Globe, Barron's, Business Week, Forbes, Fortune, Los Angeles 
Times, Money, New York Times, US News & World Report, USA Today, 
Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal. 
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• The date range was 01/01/1994 – 12/31/2000. 
• The fund name was entered as the search phrase. 
 
Each article that was brought up in the search was then read and classified. The 
classification and the corresponding characteristics of the news articles were then entered 
in a spreadsheet.  The following details were entered in the spreadsheet for each article 
for every fund: 
• Fund name used as the search phrase 
• Date of the article 
• Name of the publication in which the article appeared 
• Page number, if available, on which the article appeared 
• Code for the tone of the article as classified into one of the specified 
categories: 
 PS:  Positive  
The fund is portrayed in a clearly positive light. There is a substantial 
emphasis on the positive aspects of the fund.  
 NP: Neutral-Positive  
The fund is portrayed in a marginally positive way. Bulk of the news 
story is not dedicated to portraying the fund in a positive light but 
there is still a positive posture.   
 NT: Neutral  
The article mentions the fund in a neutral way with no positive or 
negative slant towards the fund.  
 NN: Neutral-Negative 
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The fund is portrayed in a marginally negative way. Bulk of the news 
story is not dedicated to portraying the fund in a negative light but 
there is still a negative posture.   
 NG: Negative  
The fund is portrayed in a clearly negative light.  
• Code for the type of the article as classified into one of the specified 
categories: 
 FR: Feature  
The fund is portrayed in some detail. 
 IN:  Interview  
The article portrays an interview, usually with a fund manager. 
 RK: Ranking  
The fund is portrayed with a numerical ranking. 
 PF:  Performance  
The article portrays the fund’s performance. 
 MN: Mention 
The article merely mentions the fund. 
 TB: Tables 
The fund is portrayed only in a table. 
The criteria for classification of the type of news articles are as follows: 
 The type of news article is classified in the order of the above listing. First, 
one checks if the article can be classified as FR. If an article focuses on a fund to the 
extent that a considerable portion, if not all, of the article portrays the fund, then the 
article is classified as FR.  If an article cannot be classified as FR, then one sees of it can 
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be classified as IN. If an article details an interview, usually with a fund manager, then it 
is classified as IN.  
If an article cannot be classified as FR or IN, then the next step is to look for a 
numerical ranking for the fund in the article. If the fund is assigned a numerical ranking 
anywhere in the text or table section of the news story, then RK is assigned to the story. If 
the article discusses the fund’s performance but does not assign a numerical ranking, then 
the article is classified as PF.  
If a news story does not qualify for FR, IN, RK or PF, and merely mentions  the 
fund in a non-performance context, then the news story is classified as MN. When the 
fund is mentioned nowhere in the text part of the article, and only appears in a table 
(without a numerical ranking), then the article is classified as TB. 
 
Computer program versus manual classification 
Computer programs used for quantitative content analysis are usually pure word 
count programs. Such programs typically gather information by counting the words that 
fall within certain predetermined categories, for example, ‘positive’ or ‘negative’.  The 
advantage to this method is that it can be perfectly replicated, but there are a lot of 
disadvantages as well. The word categories are neither mutually exclusive nor 
exhaustive. The programs do not usually categorize combinations of words that often 
possess different meanings from the constituent words. Tetlock (forthcoming JF) 
provides the following example of this fault. Consider the sentences: “No, the economy is 
not strong” and “It is not that the economy is not strong.” The computer program 
understands and categorizes all of the important words in both sentences, but pure 
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category counts would suggest that these sentences have identical meanings. In fact, the 
sentences have opposite meanings. 
All of the above disadvantages can potentially be eliminated by adopting the 
human or manual approach to news classification. Each researcher is specifically trained 
to read through the entire article and then subsequently classify it based on their 
understanding of its content. This ensures that the semantic and stylistic noise does not in 
any way obscure the interpretations of the news stories. Individually monitored training 
also ensures consistency when repeated by different individuals. Finally, reclassification 
by the team leader of a random portion of the news stories that are classified by the 
research team ensures total compliance.  
 
Construction of news variables based on classification  
I build on the classification of tone and type of news article to construct the other 
news variables as follows: 
News Flag (dummy) variables:      
Article Flag:    
ARTFi,t = 1 if fund i has a news article in period t, else = 0   
Positive Flag:   
PBFi,t = 1 if fund i has a PS or NP news article in period t, else = 0 Neutral 
Flag:   
UBFi,t = 1 if fund i has a NT news article in period t, else = 0  
Negative Flag:   
NBFi,t = 1 if fund i has a NG or NN news article in period t, else = 0  
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News Count variables:      
Total Article count: 
ARTCi,t = #PSi,t + #NPi,t + #NTi,t + #NNi,t + #NGi,t   
Positive Count: 
 PBCi,t  = #PSi,t + #NPi,t   
Neutral Count:   
UBCi,t  = #NTi,t   
Negative Count: 
 NBCi,t  = #NGi,t + #NNi,t   
 
Feature and Interview Count: 
  FRINi,t = #FRi,t + #INi,t   
Mention and Tables Count: 
 MNTBi,t = #MNi,t + #TBi,t   
Performance and Ranking Count: 
PFRKi,t = #PFi,t + #RKi,t   
 
Cumulative Article Count: 






ARTC , where  
    t = 1 is the first period in the sample (Jan 1994) 





Circulation news variable: 












tij  , where 
   Aj,i,t = # articles in periodical j for fund i in period t 




Derivation of the Heckman Model 
The basic idea of sample selection models is that the outcome variable, y, is only 
observed if some criterion, defined with respect to a different variable, z, is met. The 
standard form of the model has two stages:  
• In the first stage, a dichotomous variable z (= 0 or 1) determines whether or 
not y is observed, y being observed only if z = 1.  
• In the second stage, the expected value of y is modeled, conditional on its 
having been observed.   
The standard regression model yi = x′iβ + εi assumes that the data represents a 
random sample from some population of interest. When, for some reason, the sample is 
non-random, the OLS estimator can produce biased and inconsistent estimates.  
The Heckman model can be defined by a set of two equations that describe the 
selection regression model (probit) and the outcome regression model (linear). 
 
Selection Regression Model: 










0  z  if  0  










i uγwz  +′=
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Outcome Regression Model: 
 εβxy ii
*
i +′=      (C.2)  
yi = yi* if zi = 1 
yi not observed if zi = 0 
 
where ui and εi have a joint distribution that is bivariate normal with zero mean, 
standard deviations of σu and σε, and correlation of ρ. z is the variable that the selection is 
based on and y is observed when z has a value of 1. The observed dummy variable z is a 
realization of an unobserved continuous variable z*. The latent variable z* can be 
interpreted as the propensity to be included in the sample.  
The probit model for the probability of z = 1 is estimated using all the 
observations and yielding coefficient vector α: 
pr (zi =1) = Φ (wi'γ) 
 
Since α and σu are not separately identifiable in the probit, we may without loss 
of generality normalize u such that its variance is equal to 1, giving us σu = 1. The second 
step is to estimate the expected value of y, conditional on z = 1 and on the vector xi. 
 
E [yi | z =1, xi] = x i'β + E [εi | zi = 1]   (C.3a) 
         = x i'β + E [εi | ui > wi'γ] 
 
To evaluate the conditional expectation of ε in equation (C.3a), one can use the 
result from statistical theory that says that the expected value of one of the variables in a 
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bivariate distribution (in this case, ε) censored with respect to the value of the other 











     (C.3b)  
 
where φ and Φ are the standardized normal density and distribution functions 
respectively. 
Inserting equation (C.3b) into equation (C.3a),    
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   (C.3c)   
  
Heckman’s two-step procedure consists of first estimating the selection equation 
(C.1) as a probit model. Using the probit results, the estimate of φi/Φi (the inverse Mill's 
ratio or Hazard ratio, symbolized by λi) is computed for the subsample where z = 1. 
Then, for this same subsample, OLS is used to regress y on xi with the estimate of λi as 
an additional explanatory variable: 
  
iiiii λ̂θ  βx  ) x1, z |(y E +′==      (C.4) 
 
This will yield estimates of β and θ. θ is an estimate of ρ times σε, which, because 
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Heckman (1979) shows that selection bias can be thought of as a form of omitted 
variable bias. The two-step model explicitly addresses bias caused by correlation of the 
regressor with omitted variables, by adding a term to the least squares regression that 
represents the non-zero expectation of the error term. T'o simply take those cases with 
observations on y and regress yi on xi, will result in biased estimates of the vector β. 
Equation (C.4) shows that it is the omitted variable λ that causes the OLS estimation to 
be biased, where λ is the Hazard ratio, also known as Inverse Mill’s ratio. The problem 
of sample-selection bias thus becomes equivalent to a misspecification problem arising 
through the omission of a regressor variable. However, the OLS estimates of β will be 
unbiased if there is no correlation between the error terms of the two equations. If ρ = 0, 
this means that θ in Equation (C.4) must also be zero, and thus Equation (C.4) reduces to 
the usual OLS equation. This corresponds to the situation in which selection and outcome 
are independent.   
Heckman’s two-stage estimator is perhaps the most widely used approach to 
selection bias. Instead of using maximum likelihood, the two-stage method permits 
estimation of the model by use of simpler statistical procedures like least squares and 
probit analysis. This is particularly useful if maximum likelihood will not converge. 
However, the Heckman two-step method gives consistent estimates of β but not of σ, nor 
are the asymptotic standard errors consistent. As a result, adjustments must be made to 





 δi  =  - λi (zi + λi)           
where  zi = wi'γ  from the probit step.  
Then, let sε be the uncorrected estimate of σε from the regression (second) step of 
the Heckman procedure, and let S be the sum of squared deviations from this regression: 
 








where the sum is taken over all observations for which z = 1. The correct 
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      (C.5) 
where N is the number of observations for which z = 1 and θ is the 
estimated regression coefficient for λ.31   
Heteroscedasticity in model (C.4) causes the standard errors to be 
incorrect. The standard errors are incorrect also because the use of an estimate of 
λ, rather than λ itself, means that the standard errors for the β coefficients will 
need to take account of the error in the estimate of λ.  The uncorrected OLS 
standard errors can be either larger or smaller than the corrected ones. Hence, they 
cannot be used as lower bounds on the true standard errors. The formula for the 
correct covariance matrix of the estimates of β and σε, V, is given by the matrix 
equation 
 
                                                 
31 Heckman (1979), Greene (2000).  
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          (C.6) 
  
The standard errors of the parameter estimates are given by the square root 
of the diagonal elements of V. Here, *X is the matrix [x:λ]; W is the matrix of 
explanatory variables from the probit equation; Δ is the matrix with the elements 
δi on its diagonal, zeros elsewhere; I is the identity matrix; and Σ is the 
asymptotic covariance matrix for the parameters of the probit equation. ρ is 
estimated by  
 
εσ̂
θ̂  ρ̂ =           (C.7) 
 
An alternate approach to estimate the Heckman model is Maximum likelihood 
estimation, which overcomes the difficulties associated with the two-step approach – 
notably, that the estimated standard errors of the coefficients and the estimate of sigma 
are all incorrect. The log-likelihood function needs to be specified before estimation of 
the model. 
All those cases where z = 0 contribute 1- Φ (wi'γ) to the likelihood.  
Those cases where z = 1 contribute 
 
 1)z|(y  
σ
1   γ)w( Φ iii =×′ φ      (C.8) 
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where σ is the standard deviation of y* conditional on z = 1  and φ(yi | zi =1) is the 
conditional density function of y* given z = 1. Equation (C.8) is the expression for the 
probability of being selected multiplied by the density of y conditional on having been 
selected. To put this into a tractable form for estimation, some further manipulations are 
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The log-likelihood can be derived by inserting the above expression for those 
observations where z = 0 and taking logarithms. The log-likelihood function of the 
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Once the likelihood function is specified, nonlinear optimization is used to 
maximize the likelihood function and calculate the standard errors of the estimates. The 
likelihood equation can be used to show the circumstances under which this model 
reduces to something simpler. If ρ = 0, then equation (C.10) can be split into two parts:  
• The first part is a probit for the probability of being selected and comprises of 
the first and fourth terms in the equation. 
• The second part is an OLS regression for the expected value of y in the 
selected subsample and comprises of the second and third terms in the 
equation. 
 Furthermore, because these two parts share no common parameters, they can be 
estimated separately. This shows that if there is no residual correlation between ε and u, 
the simple OLS approach is adequate. Therefore, it is not the fact that observations on y 
are only available for a selected sample that causes the difficulty; rather, it is that this 
selection is not random with respect to y. This is particularly applicable in the case of my 
research on media coverage of mutual funds. 
The maximum likelihood estimates have the desirable properties of being 
consistent and asymptotically efficient. However, the main criticism of the maximum 
likelihood estimation method is that it is extremely sensitive to the correct specification 
of the underlying distribution. On the other hand, Winship and Mare (1992) note that 
while Heckman’s two-stage estimator is the most widely used approach to selection bias, 
its results may be sensitive to violations of its assumptions about the way selection 
occurs.  
Breen (1996) recommends that for the sample-selection model, one should first 
compute the inverse Mill's ratio instrument using a probit model and regress this on the 
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explanatory (x) variables that appear in the outcome equation. If the R2 from this 
regression is around zero, then the outcome equation can be estimated using uncorrected 
OLS. If this is not so, then the two stages of the model should be estimated using 
maximum likelihood. If, however, the estimate of ρ in the maximum likelihood model is 
around zero, it is advisable once again to estimate the outcome equation as an 
uncorrected OLS regression. This is because the OLS estimates of β will differ little, if at 
all, from the maximum likelihood estimates but they will have smaller variances, 
particularly if R2 is large. Hence, Breen (1996) suggests that when estimating the sample-
selection model, one should use an uncorrected OLS for the outcome equation if either R2 
or the estimate of ρ is near zero; otherwise, the maximum likelihood should be used. I 
follow this recommendation from Breen. 
I use the Heckman two-step model to first compute the Hazard ratio or the Inverse 
Mill’s ratio (λ) using a probit model on the full sample and then regress this on the 
explanatory variables that appear in the outcome equation. I use the maximum likelihood 
model to estimate the correlation coefficient (ρ). I find that neither the R2 from the earlier 
model nor the ρ from the latter model is around zero, thereby ruling out the presentation 
of uncorrected OLS estimates. Therefore, I present results from the Heckman maximum 
likelihood model for the empirical analysis of the media coverage of mutual funds in 
Chapter 6 of the dissertation. I present the corresponding results from Heckman two-step 
model in Appendix D. 
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Appendix D 
Empirical Results from the Heckman Two-
Step Model 
 
Table D1. Relation of Fund Flows to Media Coverage 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This table provides 
results from the Heckman two-step model for the percentage net monthly flow into the fund as the 
dependent variable. The independent variables are the aggregate flows to the market for all funds during 
the period, the lagged flow to the fund, log of the fund’s total net assets under management (TNA) for the 
previous period, the return to the fund for the previous month, the return to the fund for the previous 
year, the fund’s age in years, and the fund’s expense ratio for the previous year.  
The media coverage variable included in Model 1 is the actual number of news stories portraying the 
fund each month. The media coverage variable included in Model 2 is the actual number of news stories 
portraying the fund each month, weighted by the proportion of the circulation of each periodical to the 
total circulation of all the twelve periodicals. p-values are provided in parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -0.031 -0.035 
 (0.345) (0.292) 
Market Flow 0.209 0.207 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Flow (t-1) 0.009 0.010 
 (0.725) (0.712) 
Return previous month -0.029 -0.028 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Return previous year 0.094 0.094 
 (0.007) (0.008) 
Log TNA (t-1) -0.088 -0.050 
 (0.950) (0.972) 
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Age -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Expense ratio (t-1) -0.143 -0.128 
 (0.037) (0.060) 
Number of news articles 0.002  
 (0.000)  
Circulation-weighted number of news articles  0.022 
  (0.001) 
Lambda 0.024 0.026 
 (0.126) (0.108) 
R2 (%) 6.78 6.71 
N 4537 4537 
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Table D2. Relation of Fund Flows to Posture of Media Coverage 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This table provides 
results from the Heckman two-step model for the percentage net monthly flow into the fund as the 
dependent variable. The independent variables are the aggregate flows to the market for all funds during 
the period, the lagged flow to the fund, log of the fund’s total net assets under management (TNA) for the 
previous period, the return to the fund for the previous month, the return to the fund for the previous 
year, the fund’s age in years, and the fund’s expense ratio for the previous year.  
The media coverage variables included in Model 1 are the dummy variables for the existence of news 
stories in each period, classified by the posture of the article towards the fund portrayed. The media 
coverage variables included in Model 2 are the numbers of news stories in each period, classified by the 
posture of the article towards the fund portrayed. p-values are provided in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -0.018 -0.014 
 (0.589) (0.666) 
Market Flow 0.198 0.195 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Flow (t-1) 0.003 0.005 
 (0.904) (0.863) 
Return previous month -0.033 -0.034 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Return previous year 0.084 0.084 
 (0.017) (0.018) 
Log TNA (t-1) -0.191 -0.196 
 (0.892) (0.890) 
Age -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Expense ratio (t-1) -0.093 -0.096 
 (0.172) (0.167) 
Dummy for whether the fund has:   
Positive media coverage 0.014  
 (0.000)  
Neutral media coverage 0.007  
 (0.051)  
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Negative media coverage -0.010  
 (0.007)  
Number of positive news articles  0.006 
  (0.000) 
Number of neutral news articles  0.002 
  (0.033) 
Number of negative news articles  -0.006 
  (0.006) 
Lambda 0.018 0.018 
 (0.262) (0.250) 
R2 (%) 7.34 7.28 
N 4537 4537 
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Table D3. Relation of Fund Flows to Interaction of Media Coverage and 
Fund Size 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This table provides 
results from the Heckman two-step model for the percentage net monthly flow into the fund as the 
dependent variable. The independent variables are the aggregate flows to the market for all funds during 
the period, the lagged flow to the fund, log of the fund’s total net assets under management (TNA) for the 
previous period, the return to the fund for the previous month, the return to the fund for the previous 
year, the fund’s age in years, and the fund’s expense ratio for the previous year.  
The media coverage variables included in Model 1 are the actual number of news stories portraying the 
fund each month, and the interaction terms between the log of the fund’s TNA for the previous period 
and the number of news articles in the current period. The media coverage variables included in Model 2 
are the numbers of news stories in each period, classified by the posture of the article towards the fund 
portrayed, and the interaction terms between these news count variables and the log of the fund’s TNA 
for the previous period. p-values are provided in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -0.066 -0.062 
 (0.049) (0.065) 
Market Flow 0.209 0.187 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Flow (t-1)  0.004  -0.004 
 (0.875) (0.874) 
Return previous month -0.021 -0.026 
 (0.002) (0.000) 
Return previous year 0.095 0.078 
 (0.007) (0.023) 
Log TNA (t-1)  0.261  0.269 
 (0.852) (0.848) 
Age -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Expense ratio (t-1) -0.190 -0.097 
 (0.006) (0.172) 
Number of news articles 0 .014  
 (0.000)  
Log TNA (t-1) * Number of news articles -0.001  
 (0.000)  
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Number of positive news articles  0 .031 
  (0.000) 
Number of neutral news articles   0.014 
  (0.000) 
Number of negative news articles  0 .003 
  (0.339) 
 -0.003 Log TNA (t-1) * 
 Number of positive news articles  (0.000) 
 -0 .001 Log TNA (t-1) * 
 Number of neutral news articles  (0.000) 
 -0.001 Log TNA (t-1) * 
 Number of negative news articles  (0.084) 
Lambda 0.030 0.028 
 (0.056) (0.079) 
R2 (%) 8.60 8.37 
N 4537 4537 
 168
Table D4. Relation of Fund Flows to Interaction of Media Coverage and 
Fund Performance  
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This table provides 
results from the Heckman two-step model for the percentage net monthly flow into the fund as the 
dependent variable. The independent variables are the aggregate flows to the market for all funds during 
the period, the lagged flow to the fund, log of the fund’s total net assets under management (TNA) for the 
previous period, the return to the fund for the previous month, the return to the fund for the previous 
year, the fund’s age in years, and the fund’s expense ratio for the previous year.  
The media coverage variables included in Model 1 are the actual number of news stories portraying the 
fund each month, and the interaction terms between the return to the fund for the previous year and the 
number of news articles in the current period. The media coverage variables included in Model 2 are the 
numbers of news stories in each period, classified by the posture of the article towards the fund 
portrayed, and the interaction terms between these news count variables and the return to the fund for the 
previous year.  p-values are provided in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -0.026 -0.029 
 (0.437) (0.378) 
Market Flow 0.219 0.217 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Flow (t-1)  0.009  -0.002 
 (0.731) (0.928) 
Return previous month -0.034 -0.034 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Return previous year 0.113 0.113 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Log TNA (t-1)  -0.145  -0.125 
 (0.918) (0.929) 
Age -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Expense ratio (t-1) -0.158 -0.122 
 (0.022) (0.076) 
Number of news articles 0 .004  
 (0.000)  
Return previous year * Number of news articles -0.007  
 (0.006)  
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Number of positive news articles  0 .003 
  (0.151) 
Number of neutral news articles   0.007 
  (0.000) 
Number of negative news articles  -0 .004 
  (0.078) 
  0.012 Return previous year * 
 Number of positive news articles  (0.004) 
 -0 .021 Return previous year * 
 Number of neutral news articles  (0.000) 
 -0.035 Return previous year * 
 Number of negative news articles  (0.000) 
Lambda 0.019 0.021 
 (0.220) (0.018) 
R2 (%) 6.93 8.57 
N 4537 4537 
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Table D5. Relation of Fund Flows to Media Coverage considering Age 
of Fund 
The sample includes growth funds that existed over the 1994-2000 time period. This table provides 
results from the Heckman two-step model for the percentage net monthly flow into the fund as the 
dependent variable. The independent variables are the aggregate flows to the market for all funds during 
the period, the lagged flow to the fund, log of the fund’s total net assets under management (TNA) for the 
previous period, the return to the fund for the previous month, the return to the fund for the previous 
year, the fund’s age in years, and the fund’s expense ratio for the previous year.  
The media coverage variables included in Model 1 are the number of news articles about the fund in the 
period, and the cumulative number of news articles about the fund beginning in 1994 till the current 
period, along with the interaction terms between the age variable and the number of news articles and 
between the age variable and the cumulative number of news articles.  The media coverage variables 
included in Model 2 are the number of news articles about the fund in the period, and the cumulative 
number of news articles about the fund beginning in 1994 till the current period, along with the 
interaction terms between the age group dummy variables and the number of news articles and between 
the age group dummy variables and the cumulative number of news articles. p-values are provided in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept  0.018 -0.039 
 (0.626) (0.300) 
Market Flow 0.145 0.142 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Flow (t-1) 0.003 -0.009 
 (0.895) (0.514) 
Return previous month -0.035 -0.020 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Return previous year 0.092 0.087 
 (0.025) (0.016) 
Log TNA (t-1) -0.256 -0.049 
 (0.855) (0.804) 
Age -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.034) 
Expense ratio (t-1) -0.147 -0.150 
 (0.033) (0.029) 
Number of news articles 0.005 0 .002 
 (0.000) (0.139) 
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Cumulative number of news articles -0.034 -0.020 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Age * Number of news articles -0.0001  
 (0.003)  
Age *  Cumulative number of news articles 0.001  
 (0.008)  
Young funds * Number of news articles  0.012 
  (0.000) 
Young funds * Cumulative number of news articles  -0.011 
  (0.190) 
Old funds * Number of news articles  -0.001 
  (0.383) 
Old funds * Cumulative number of news articles  0.006 
  (0.435) 
Lambda 0.006 0.029 
 (0.723) (0.097) 
R2 (%) 7.35 8.52 
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